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The Concept of "Less Eligibility" and the
Social Function of Prison Violence
in Class Society
AHMED A. WHITEt
INTRODUCTION

To what extent are rapes, beatings, and other assaults
essential to the punitive function of the modern prison?
Officially, violence of this sort is unlawful and clearly
outside the bounds of legitimate punishment. The United
States Supreme Court has declared more than once that
being assaulted is not "part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society."1 Likewise,
Congress has recently enacted legislation condemning
prison rape, the most salient form of prison violence, and
purporting to eradicate it from contemporary prisons. 2
Indeed, the view that assaults are not legitimate aspects of
punishment is ubiquitous among representatives of the
legal, political, and academic establishment, all of whom,
virtually without exception, regard such violence as a
deviant, dysfunctional phenomenon with no legitimate
place in the realm of modern punishment. 3
In reality, violence thoroughly defines the prison
experience. Prisoners face a substantial risk of being
beaten, raped, and even killed at the hands of their fellow

t Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I would like
to thank my colleagues at the University of Colorado School of Law for their
many helpful comments on this article and its constituent ideas. I am
especially indebted to Emily Calhoun, Lakshman Guruswami, Laura Spitz, and
Mark Squillace.
1. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); see also Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991);
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976).
2. See Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-09 (Supp. 2005).
3. See infra Part II(C).
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inmates or keepers. 4 In a way that is sometimes difficult for
those who are unfamiliar with prison to appreciate,
prisoners inhabit a world comprehensively defined by this
kind of violence. Such violence is the dominant arbiter of
social status in prison. It is the means by which authority,
hierarchy, and privilege are articulated among prisoners
and between prisoners and their keepers. And it is,
paradoxically, the most reliable protection against being the
victim of violence.
The fact that violence so thoroughly defines the prison
experience in these ways calls into question the truth of the
official, conventional view that places it outside the bounds
of punishment policy. Indeed, a critical reflection on the
social meaning of violence in prison, one that focuses on the
social function of the prison, the reality of the prison
experience, and the relationship of that reality to life and
social structure outside of prison, supports the very
different and disturbing conclusion that violence is actually
integral to the prison's role as prison in contemporary
society. Such a critique, which this Article develops,
suggests that violence is an essential means by which the
prison has sustained its punitive function amidst the
unrelenting depredations and insecurities of lower class life
in contemporary America.
This argument is premised on the fact that the prison's
inhabitants are overwhelmingly the unemployed, the5
underemployed, and other denizens of the lower classes.
This reality reflects the underlying fact that imprisonment
is fundamentally geared to imposing retribution and
deterrence on those who flout norms of property and order,
or who otherwise translate the pressures of social
marginality and material deprivation into violent or
otherwise unacceptable behaviors. In any case, this falls
overwhelmingly on the poor. Ideally-that is, by its own
stated ideals-the prison would advance this agenda by
inflicting on these people punishments that are integral to
its formal and legally authorized structure, which is to say
by depriving inmates of the social and material benefits of a
free-world existence and subjecting them to intensive
regimentation and control. Critically, however, such means
of punishment are relevant only in relationship to the lives
4. Violence in the contemporary prison is discussed infra Part II(B).
5. See infra Part III(B).
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that those who would be punished are fated to live outside
of prison, which for the people the prison means to punish,
are characterized by relentless poverty, inequality, and
social marginality; by profound material deprivation and
insecurity; and by altogether woeful life prospects. At the
same time, the material conditions of prison life, while by
no means fundamentally attractive, have improved
significantly-to the point that, in some ways, prisoners
may well experience greater material support and security
in prison than is typical of their free world existences. In
the context of these convergent developments, violence
constitutes a crucial means by which the prison has
maintained its punitive function and with this its relevance
as a means of social control.
In fact, this Article argues, the importance of violence
to the punitive function of the prison has actually increased
over the last several decades, in response to a deterioration
of the conditions of lower class life wrought by structural
changes including the demise of the manufacturing sector,
the decline of organized labor, the onset of chronic fiscal
crisis, and the retrenchment of the welfare state. As these
changes have consigned the poor ever more thoroughly to a
world of deprivation and insecurity, they have placed a
greater premium on the punitive function of violence in
prison. Thus, the prerequisites of prison violence, as well as
the root impediment to its eradication, may be located, not
simply in failings of law and policy, but in the political
economy of contemporary capitalism.
This critique of the larger social meaning of prison
violence draws on the concept of "less eligibility." Initially
formulated by early Nineteenth
Century liberals,
principally Jeremy Bentham, 6 the concept of less (or
"lesser," depending on the usage) eligibility was first
articulated in a truly critical fashion by Twentieth Century
critical theorist and criminologist Georg Rusche.7 For
Rusche less eligibility embraces the general proposition
that the criminal justice system must present to its usual
subjects-again, the unemployed, the underemployed, and
the poor generally-punishments that are worse than their
6. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon;Or, The Inspection-House, in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37, 122-23 (John Bowring ed. 1843).
7. Rusche's development of the concept of less eligibility is discussed infra
Part III(A).
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typical conditions of life in the free world. Otherwise, said
Rusche, the prison in particular, as the dominant form of
modern punishment, would lose its punitive effect. It might
then become a refuge from the deprivations and
uncertainties of law-abiding life, sought after by the poor.
Or, more likely, it might lose its ability to deter or
otherwise sanction the pursuit of criminality as a life course
or as a reaction to debased life conditions. By either route,
such a failure of less eligibility would negate the prison's
ability to function as an effective mechanism of social
control.
Importantly, the fact that the kind of violence this
critique concerns itself with is illegal does not necessarily
refute its relevance to the logic of less eligibility. To the
contrary: That such violence is so thoroughly unlawful
allows it to serve the state as a mode of punishment
without the state ever confessing the true extent of its
resort to such barbarity and without thereby surrendering
much in the way of its legal and political legitimacy.
Indeed, by deeming prison violence illegal, the state in its
various
manifestations
can actually condemn the
phenomenon, while yet relying on it as part of regime of
control. In similar fashion, the illegality of this violence also
impedes a true grasp of its functions, as it induces critics of
prison violence to mistake illegality for a mark of deviance,
and then to see prison violence as a problem calling for
greater and more effective legal regulation-and not, as I
contend is the better argument, as a phenomenon
unhappily intrinsic to punishment in a class society.
It should be stressed at the outset that what makes
prison violence relevant in this critique is not that a prison
experience free of rape, stabbings, and other assaults is in
any objective sense devoid of considerable punitive effect.
Clearly the very fact of incarceration even under ideal
conditions is intensely unpleasant. Indeed, prison is hell,
under the best of circumstances. But, critically, so are the
lives of poor people. It is this potential equivalency or
comparability of misery between these realms, and not the
idea that prison is otherwise a fundamentally nice place,
that highlights the importance of violence to the prison's
social function. Or, to make the point differently, less
eligibility presents the issue of punishment as a question of
effective punishment, in which the determinative factors
are both relative and contextual: relative in the sense that
the punitive function of prison depends on the life
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conditions of would-be prisoners outside of prison; and
contextual in that this question of relative punition varies
both historically and with the social circumstances of those
to be punished. And the prison in this sense can indeed by
relatively un-punitive and thus unsuited to its central
purpose of punishing the poor.
I develop this argument in several parts. Part II
reviews the state of violence and material existence in
American prisons. Drawing on empirical studies as well as
narrative accounts, it stresses the prevalence and normalcy
of rape, torture, and other practices, and the importance of
these dynamics in defining the prison experience. It then
describes briefly how, in contrast to violence, the material
conditions of prison have more or less steadily improved
over the past several decades. Finally, this Part reviews the
role of law in this realm. Developing a point anticipated in
this introduction, it stresses the law's contradictory
tendency to formally renounce violence as a legitimate
aspect of punishment, while actually doing relatively little
to prevent its occurrence, and builds from this a critique of
law's role in legitimating prison violence and frustrating a
critical appreciation of violence's constitutive role in the
contemporary prison.
Part III undertakes to explain prison violence by the
logic of less eligibility. To do this, it first considers at
greater length how Rusche developed less eligibility into a
critical concept capable of exposing the latent functions of
modern punishment. Second, drawing on both empirical
sources and critical literature on the nature of criminal
sanction, this Part describes the extraordinary degree to
which the criminal justice system focuses on the poor and
the degree to which this focus reflects not only a quest for
public order and safety, but an agenda of control and class
domination. Finally, invoking both empirical and other
evidence of the deterioration of lower class social conditions
over the last three decades, and evidence of widespread
tolerance of such conditions in both official and lay
quarters, this Part develops the central claim that the
brutality of the contemporary prison represents a normal,
socially functional mechanism by which prison has
maintained its punitive relevance and its legitimacy as
punishment, amidst deprivation, gross inequalities, and
other features of lower class life in contemporary American
society. Part IV is a conclusion that highlights the
implications of this critique, in particular what it says
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about the inherent barbarity of prison as a form of social
control in contemporary capitalist society and the
inadequacy of liberal critique to understanding this
dynamic.
I. VIOLENCE, THE LAW, AND MATERIAL EXISTENCE IN PRISON

One of the most startling developments in law and
policy of the last half century involves a dramatic growth in
the prevalence of incarceration. Today well over two million
people are incarcerated in America, about two-thirds of
them (over 1.4 million) in prisons and the remainder (about
750,000) in local jails.8 These figures reflect an
incarceration rate that is higher than that of any other
country in the world 9 and also entirely unprecedented in
American history. Since 1980, the number of people in
criminal confinement in the United States has increased
five-fold. 10 The increase since 1960 has been even more
dramatic. 1 These absolute increases have far outstripped
overall population growth, such that the rate of
increased dramatically over the last
incarceration has
12
several decades.
This dramatic increase in the overall scale of
punishment is the immediate result of a number of discrete
shifts in sentencing law and policy, in particular limitations
on the availability of discretionary release from custody and
the creation of new concepts of criminality. This trend has
been roundly condemned by critics, who have questioned
whether imprisoning so many people has conveyed any
8. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE: ADULTS ON PROBATION, IN JAIL OR PRISON, AND
ON PAROLE, tbl.6.1.2006 (2006). http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6l2006.pdf.
9. Haeyoun Park et al., Prison Populations Around the Globe,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/
04/22/us/20080423_PRISONGRAPHIC.html#.
10. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE: ADULTS ON
PROBATION, IN JAIL OR PRISON, AND ON PAROLE, supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., HENRY RUTH & KEVIN R. REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 18-22

(2003).
12. See, e.g., THOMAS P. BONCzAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ
197976, PREVALANCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1
(2003),

available

at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piuspOl.pdf;

SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE: ADULTS ON PROBATION, IN
JAIL OR PRISON, AND ON PAROLE, supra note 8, at tbl.6.13(2007),

http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6132007.pdf.
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worthwhile benefits in crime prevention or even reasonable
measures of retribution, and have also emphasized the
unacceptable human costs
and the destructive social
13
consequences of doing so.
A. The Emerging Role of Violence in the Prison
However problematic these quantitative increases in
incarceration may be, numbers alone do not capture the
significant ways in which criminal punishment has evolved
over the last several decades. Since the late 1960s, prisons
have undergone an important qualitative change, centered
on the changing role of violence in constituting their social
order. Of course, the prison experience has always been
violent, and violent in several different ways. To lawfully
confine someone against their will presupposes a
prerogative to maintain that condition by force, which is
realized quite tangibly in the prison's defining structures
and practices-its walls and bars and fences; its guard
towers; the near comprehensive authority that prison
14
administrators and staff wield over inmates' lives.
However, the prison has also been violent in more explicit
ways that transcend these more abstract, existential
elements. This more overt mode of violence, clearly revealed
in assaults among inmates and between inmates and prison
officials, has also characterized the prison since its
inception. But this kind of violence has undergone palpable
changes in form and prevalence, as well as social meaning.
It is through such changes that violence has come to occupy
a uniquely significant role in the structure and meaning of
the contemporary prison. A brief reflection on the evolution
of the prison over the last 100 years or so helps to frame
this point.
During the first half of the Twentieth Century,
American prisons came to conform to a considerable degree
to a particular model of governance and organization, which
penologist John Irwin (among others) calls the "Big

13. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF
INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2004); ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF
INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 11-28 (2004); REITZ & RUTH, supra

note 11.
14. This theme is one of several explored in the excellent essay by Anthony
E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in Prisons, 26 CRIME &
JUST. 205 (1999).
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House."'15 In many ways, the Big House realized the
stereotypical representations of the prison in early and mid
Twentieth Century film and literature: a methodical
architecture of cells, cell blocks, and tiers; an array of
distinctive common areas ("the yard," the prison cafeteria,
the various factory-like working areas); and an imposing
wall that embraced the institution, starkly defining its
spatial limits. 16 This architecture both reflected and helped

to shape an equally distinct social structure, marked above
all by the comprehensive (and, especially in a passive way,
quite violent) regimentation of inmate life. As Irwin
describes it, the Big House was fundamentally a "place of
banishment and punishment.... Its major characteristics
were isolation, routine, and monotony. Its mood was mean
and grim ....
-17 The Big House was also a place of selfregimentation, in which prisoners developed and adhered to
relatively rigid hierarchies and social norms that put a
surprisingly high premium on stability and the
containment of conflict.' 8 As a result, while the Big House
prison was by no means devoid of overt acts of violence, its
structures combined to limit the prevalence of such violence
as well as to limit its role in the internal governance of the
prison and in the constitution of prison culture. 19
The Big House began mid-century to be replaced as the
dominant model of prison by what Irwin calls the
"correctional institution." 20 This shift was occasioned in the
first place by changes in both social structure and penal
policy, marked by increasing ethnic and racial diversity of
inmate populations, which eroded the structural
underpinnings of the Big House's norms and hierarchies. 21
Second, the move to the correctional model was grounded in
a new penological orthodoxy focused on uncovering the
social and psychological causes of crime as well as the

15. JOHN IRWIN, PRISONS IN TURMOIL 3-5 (1980).
16.

Id.

17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 8-21.
19. See MATHEW SILBERMAN,
AMERICA 61-64, 116-18 (1995).
20. IRWIN, supranote 15, at 37.
21. Id. at 62.

A WORLD OF VIOLENCE:

CORRECTIONS

IN
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prospects of rehabilitation. 22 The "correctional values"
implicit in these approaches were realized in this new
model by a liberalization of prison administration, at the
center of which was an expanded focus on therapy,
education and job training, and other reformist efforts,
often integrated with newly rationalized, discretionary
sentencing practices. 23 Although this successor model of
punishment thus displaced many of the Big House's
governing norms with very different structures of control
and conflict mediation, it managed by most accounts to
maintain relatively low levels of overt violence and to hold
in check the role of such violence in institutional
governance and culture. 24 According to Irwin, the
correctional
institution's
embrace
of rehabilitative
approaches was especially effective in promoting "peace and
stability," as the ideology itself as well as the many
programs devised to effectuate it gave structure and
meaning to the prison experience, distracted inmates from
more destructive behaviors, and
generally devalued conflict
25
and violence in everyday life.
The correctional model prevailed (more or less) in the
1950s and into the 1960s. 26 But already in the early 1960s,
it was under pressure. 27 And by the mid 1970s the
correctional model had totally collapsed, superseded by a
very different regime. 28 What emerged by the late 1970s
was a model of imprisonment defined much more than its
predecessors by violence: not only violence of the passive
and implicit sort that inheres in the very fact of
imprisonment, which was often greatly expanded by new,
more vigorous technologies of control, but violence in
pronounced and overt forms-violence as the actual
experience of serious assaults, as pervasive risk of
victimization, and as thoroughly constitutive of the culture
and social order of the prison. 29 The reasons for this

22. Id. at 44-47, 60-62.
23. Id.
24. See SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 61-64.

25. IRWIN, supra note 15, at 60-62.
26. Id. at 37, 66.
27. Id. at 66, 72-78.
28. Id. at 161-212.
29. Id.
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transition are several, involving demographic changes,
changes in the internal politics of the prison and in
punishment policies, and a shift in the overarching politics
of crime and social order. 30 The ways in which these
changes increased violence are fairly straightforward,
having to do with their destabilizing effect on prison
institutions and norms and their eventual tendency to add
new dimensions of conflict to prison life and to introduce
new, violent media for the resolution of conflict. 31 A brief
review of how this happened reveals these points and at the
same time provides an introduction to a later discussion of
the social context that has shaped this condition of violence
and that gives it meaning.
By the early 1960s, the proportion of black inmates in
American prisons had begun a steady rise, one which
continues to this day. 32 As the number of black inmates
increased, so did their efforts to assert prerogatives
traditionally denied them in prison by white and Hispanic
inmates and by prison administrators. 33 These efforts
internalized militant (and sometimes radical) themes from
the emergent politics of Black Nationalist and radical
groups. This was in turn articulated in different ways. To a
degree, militancy took the form of direct challenges to white
and Hispanic prisoners-for space, access to the perquisites
of confinement, and the like. Of course this approach
fomented counter-organization and reaction by whites and
Hispanics and ultimately a pattern of considerable
conflict-and violence-among all these groups which
remains in place today. 34 To a significant degree too,
30. See id. at chs. 4-7.
31. According to criminologist Mathew Silberman, the rehabilitative, rights-

based, "corrective" regime preconditioned the rise of a new model, pervaded by
violence, by means of "decoupling" formal authority structures in the prison
from informal authority structures, thus leaving those informal structures to redevelop around agendas defined primarily by the interests of powerful inmate
factions. The shift in punishment philosophy in a harsher, more punitive
direction, gave barbaric conditions that developed an ideological justification.
SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 116-24.
32. See BONCZAR, supra note 12, at 1-4; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997, fig.
3, at 7 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpvs97.pdf;
REITZ & RUTH, supranote 11 at 31.
33. See IRWIN, supra note 15, at 66-88.
34. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE

AGE OF CRISIS 2000 (1999).
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though, the demand for racial standing emanating from
black prisoners lay the groundwork for a broader, more
explicitly political and universalist push for prisoners'
rights-and even, to a degree, for radical social change.
However manifested, and however well-justified by a
history of racial repression and even visions of social
justice, this movement also contributed to increased
violence. 35 Beyond its immediate tendency to heighten
racial strife, it had the effect of destabilizing existing
hierarchies and norms, and de-legitimating existing
institutions; this increased conflict of all kinds at the same
time that it reduced the capacity of the institutions
to
resolve these conflicts in relatively peaceful ways. 36
Indeed, these changes in the demographics and group
politics of the prison contributed in another way to
escalating violence, in particular by the role they played in
altering the politics and practices of prison administration,
which in turn had its own immediate effects in cultivating
violence. The assertion and counter-assertion of group
identity and politics among inmates, the stridence with
which inmates prosecuted militant and radical themes, and
the conflicts that accompanied these developments were all
widely received by prison staff and administrators as
challenges to their authority and legitimacy. 37 Often
abetted by racism, 38 the reaction of staff and administrators
evolved into increasingly overt conflict between staff and
inmates-and
resort by prison administrators
to
increasingly repressive methods of control. Inevitably, this
dynamic became self-perpetuating as repression generated
more conflict between staff and inmates as well as among
the inmates themselves; and all of this further eroded the
informal networks and norms that had stabilized the
prison. 39 Ironically, this entire dynamic was also
aggravated in some ways by the relative success of the
35. IRWIN, supranote 15, at 110-120.
36. Id. at 74-75, 110-120.
37. Irwin, for example, speaks at length of how inmates agitating for
prisoner rights or radical social change in the 1960s and 1970s not only
annoyed typically conservative prison staff and administrators, but also
exposed the problems of the prison, including violence and racism, to outside
view, thus further challenging their authority and also the very legitimacy of
the prison. See IRWIN, supranote 15, at 66-152.
38. Id. at 124-26.
39. Id. at 123-29, 133-52.
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prisoner rights movement. 40 For, while this movement
eliminated many fundamentally unjust practices and
improved the lives of inmates in key ways, it accomplished
this by means like inmate strikes, lawsuits, legislative and
journalist investigations, and so forth, which were
perceived by staff and administrators as challenges to their
authority, and to which they frequently responded with
repressive, sometimes quite violent practices. 41 Indeed, the
fruits of prisoners' efforts, which took form in a set of rights
regarding disciplinary proceedings, visitation and selfexpression, and material conditions of confinement, both
further unsettled existing norms and structures, and
aggravated resentments among inmates and between
inmates and staff.42 In any case, according to Irwin, a major
consequence of the focused crackdowns on inmate radicals
and activists and the groups they formed in the 1960s and
1970s was the creation of power vacuums that were then
43
occupied by more purely criminal-and violent-gangs.
At least as important as these effects in the
proliferation of a culture of violence was a thoroughgoing
shift in the politics of incarceration. The politics of "law
and order" that emerged in the late 1960s entailed a
decisive repudiation of the rehabilitative ideal in favor of an
approach that saw imprisonment fundamentally as a
means of punishment. 44 In this new political context, many
programs that had worked to stabilize the social order of
the prison were eliminated without being replaced with
equally functional substitutes. 45 Moreover, by so firmly
embracing punishment as the central goal of incarceration,
this shift in the politics and ideology of incarceration
legitimated the very violence that it was-in partostensibly concerned with controlling. Ironically, as the
next section elaborates, violence itself became a more
prominent part of the prison's punitive apparatus, as a
means by which the new politics of punishment realized
their ambition.
40. Id. at 133-52.
41. Id.
42. These gains are discussed infra,Part II.
43. See IRWIN, supra note 15, at 133-52.
44. On this development, see, for example, PARENTI, supranote 34, at 3-38.
45. See IRWIN, supra note 15, at 181-206; SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 117-
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All of these problems were aggravated by dramatic
increases in the size of the incarcerated population. One
effect of such growth was serious and systemic
overcrowding, which stretched security resources in prison
at the same time that it likely increased already rising
levels of stress and conflict among inmates and between
inmates and staff.46 The growth of the prison population
had another effect. It also diminished resources available
for those rehabilitative and reformist programs that
survived into this period, thus further reducing their role in
stabilizing prison life. 47 Such conditions remain in place
today. 48 They continue to frame security issues and to
underlie an irrational logic by which the very prevalence of
incarceration constrains
its competent and humane
49
administration.
By all these means, violence established itself as the
defining substance of the contemporary prison experience,

46. See SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 27-28.
47. For a helpful review of these and other dysfunctions associated with
overcrowding as the problem developed in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in
contemporary times, see Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding:
Harmful Psychological Consequences and Dysfunctional CorrectionalReactions,
22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 265 (2006).
48. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics' latest estimate, state
prison systems are operating at somewhere between 1% below and 15% above
their "rated capacities," while the federal system is operating at 40% above its
rated capacity. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 213133, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT
MIDYEAR 2005 1, 7-8 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf.
The key, of course, is the concept of "rated capacity," which is a figure based on
the relevant jurisdiction's own formal determination of how many inmates its
facilities can house. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE OF
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 210677, PRISON IN 2004 at 7 (2005),

http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf. By the more conservative and
realistic measure of "design capacity"-based on accommodations as envisaged
by architects-a number of states with large prison populations are much more
crowded. Id. California, for example, held about 165,000 inmates in 2004, which
is more than double its prisons' designed capacity of roughly 81,000; Illinois,
with about 44,000 inmates, was operating at 135% of its prisons' rated capacity,
but 161% of its design capacity. Id. at 4, 7. And of course, both of these
measures of capacity are entirely the devise of corrections authorities and are
not in any way tied to an objective measure of what constitutes decent
accommodations.
49. On the relationship between overcrowding and prison violence, see, for
example, Gerald G. Gaes & William J. McGuire, Prison Violence: The
Contribution of Crowding Versus Other Determinants of Prison Assault Rates,
22 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 41 (1985).
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as a condition in which inmates are immersed and from
which they cannot escape, and as a dominant means by
which the prison articulates its punitive function. To be
sure, on some limited grounds-in particular, the incidence
of homicide- prisons may have become somewhat less
violent in the past ten years or so. 50 But as the next Part
shows, this retrenchment has not been a general one;
violence remains very much at the center of the prison
experience. Moreover, the greater use of intensive control
methods, which seems responsible for these limited
reductions in violence, in some ways intensifies the forms of
violence that remain.
Before describing in more detail the state of violence in
prison today, a critical point must be made about the larger
social forces responsible for the development of this
situation. One might be tempted to see these changes either
in largely political terms, as the result of discrete changes
in the ideology and practice of punishment, or as the result
of isolated, even accidental, developments of one kind or
another in the domain of criminal justice. In fact, the
violence of the contemporary prison did not emerge in such
isolated fashion. Along with the larger law and order
movement of which they are a part, such things as the
repudiation of rehabilitation, the massive increase in
incarceration, and the increasing racial disparity of the
prison population constitute elements of a broader change
over the last several decades in the politics of crime and
punishment. The criminal justice system has assumed an
increasingly dominant and aggressive role in managing
challenges to property and social order that arise in a classstratified society.
By this account, which is developed at length in the
work of critical sociologists like Loic Wacquant, Katherine
Beckett, and Bruce Western, modern capitalism relies on
institutions of social control to deter impulses to disorder
and disrespect of property that flow from its essential
features: its grounding in often exploitative working
conditions, permanent unemployment, and the existence of
deep social inequality and political marginality. 51 Over the

50. See CHRISTOPHER J. MuMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, NJC 210036, SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE IN STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL
JAILS (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/shsplj.pdf.

51. See generally, Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social
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past several decades, these scholars argue, the dominant
forms of social control of the poor have evolved from a
reliance on "soft"-if pernicious-social welfare programs,
which emerged through much of the post-war era, to a
much "harder" approach rooted in the aggressive use of
criminal justice and penal institutions to impose order,
hierarchy, and discipline on those who might reject such
conditions. 52 Moreover, according to such scholars, this shift
has occurred in the context of the emergence of neo-liberal
policies which have increased social inequality and led to
the development of entrenched pockets of "advanced
marginality," and thus further inspired the embrace of
punitive, reactionary forms of social control.5 3 From such a
vantage, the changes that scholars like Irwin identify as
redefining the role of violence in prison are best seen, not as
developments simply internal to prisons or as the products
of changing ideology, but rather, as Christian Parenti
suggests, as part of a larger shift in the politics of social
54
control of the lower classes and in political economy itself.
It is very much the aim of this Article to develop this
critique as it
relates
to prison violence. This
contextualization of the contemporary prison is significant
to this Article's analysis not only for locating the causes of
prison violence within an overarching social policy-rather
than in some simple oversight or accident of state policy, or
in neglect and indifference in the abstract-but also for
anticipating this Article's central argument about the
reflexive role that violence plays in further suiting the
prison to its role as an institution of repressive social
control in a time of crisis and inequality. We return later to
this question of the relationship between violence and class
conflict.

Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration,and the Transformation of State Policy, 3
PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 43 (2001); PARENTI, supra note 34; Loic Wacquant, Deadly

Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 95
(2001).
52. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, supra note 51; Loic
Wacquant, supra note 51. Cf. DAVID M. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:
CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).

53. Loic J. D. Wacquant, The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on its
Nature and Implications, 39 Acta Sociologica 121 (1996).
54. See PARENTI, supranote 34, at 3-66.
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B. Violence in the ContemporaryPrison
In 1958, Gresham Sykes published Society of Captives,
an exploration of the sociology of the prison. A highlight of
that book is Sykes' succinct but penetrating account of the
"pains of imprisonment"-those incidents of incarceration
that constitute its punitive dimensions, as actually
experienced by the inmates themselves. 55 Sykes perceived
that the punitive aspects of incarceration included both
"punishments which the free community deliberately
inflicts on the offender," as well as features of incarceration
that "might be seen as the unplanned (or, as some would
argue, the unavoidable) concomitants of confining large
groups of criminals for prolonged periods. ' 56 For Sykes,
these punitive aspects of imprisonment consisted of the
denial or "deprivation" of five conditions: liberty; goods and
57
services; heterosexual relations; autonomy; and security.
What is especially remarkable about Sykes account is his
inclusion here of the loss of security, as this involves a
frank recognition on his part that the "concomitants" which
help define punishment may entail experiences which are
not only devoid of formal authorization but also quite
illegal. 58
As we have already seen, the situation of violence in
prison has actually deteriorated since Sykes' day. This
condition manifests itself not in the sense that such
assaults are ubiquitous, to the point that every inmate is
either a constant victim or perpetrator (or both), or that
assaults can be seen anywhere or anytime in the prison.
Rather, the hegemony of prison violence articulates itself
though a combination of actual assaults and threats of
assault, and in particular, by the role that these play
beyond their immediate effects in comprehensively defining
social roles, constituting hierarchy, and generally
comprising a medium of social interaction and institutional
governance. In such fashion, violence embraces every
inmate whatever his or her immediate place in the matrix
of victimization and perpetration, adding to the pains of

55. See generally, GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF
A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 64 (Princeton Univ. Press 1958).

56. Id. at 64.
57. Id. at 65-78.
58. Id.
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imprisonment not only the risks and realities of death or
serious bodily injury, but an unavoidable, unremitting, and
ultimately intensely taxing obligation to participate in a
process by which one's social
being is continuously defined
59
and redefined by violence.
1. Sexual Assaults. The most notorious type of prison
violence is rape. The subject of an endless assortment of
crude jokes and stupid plot lines in popular culture, prison
rape is, in reality, a very serious component of prison life. It
is not clear exactly how frequently rape occurs in prison.
Attempts at accurate estimation are frustrated by the very
dynamics that make rape so fundamental to the culture of
the contemporary prison. Prison rape involves deep
disparities in strength and power between victim and
perpetrator, which intensify both the stigma and real risks
of retribution for those who might identify themselves as
victims. Moreover, prison administrators and staff are often
disinclined to investigate and catalogue allegations of
assault that do come their way. The result is that the crime
is underreported and difficult to account even by
sophisticated interview and survey techniques.
Data compiled pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination
Act of 2003 (PREA), which requires the Bureau of Justice
Statistics to develop reports on the subject, suggest a
surprisingly low incidence of prison rape: 6,241 "allegations
of sexual violence in prison and jail"in 2005, of which only
855 were deemed "substantiated. ' 60 But such data are
surely inaccurate, as they derive primarily from selfreporting by institutions and by inmates themselves. 61

59. Significantly, while Sykes imagined the deprivation of security to
involve victimization at the hands of other inmates-it is from his work that we
get the now-commonly quoted comment by an inmate: '"The worst thing about
prison is you have to live with other prisoners." Id. at 76-78. They are not
today, and never have been, the only deprivers of security.
60. ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 214646, SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY CORRECTIONAL
AUTHORITIES, 2005, 1 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/svrca05.pdf
(emphasis added). On the methodology employed to develop these figures, see id.
at 3-5; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DATA COLLECTION
FOR
THE
PRISON
RAPE
ELIMINATION
ACT
OF
2003
(2004),

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dcprea03.pdf.
61. Section 15601(2) of the statute notes that while "[i]nsufficient research

has been conducted" on the issue of prison rape, "experts have conservatively
estimated that at least 13 percent of the inmates in the United States have
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More careful studies of prison rape suggest something very
different. A survey of prison inmates at several Midwestern
prisons in the 1990s by Cindy and David StruckmanJohnson-one of the most comprehensive studies on this
subject yet conducted-revealed that more than 20% of
inmates "had experienced at least one incident of pressured
or forced sex while incarcerated in their state," with a
significant percentage of these apparently subject to forcible
or aggravated rape. 62 A more recent study based on a
survey of inmates in a maximum security prison in the
South in 2000 revealed that 18% of inmates had been the
target of "sexual threats," and 8.5% had been sexually
assaulted. 63 Other studies of the phenomenon
have revealed
roughly comparable rates of victimization. 64
While this literature puts to rest the notion,
encountered in some quarters, that every inmate is either
victim or perpetrator of sexual assault, it confirms that rape
occurs relatively frequently in prison-frequently enough to
play a key role in defining the prison experience. 65 The
importance of rape in this regard is very much accentuated
by the particular ways in which it occurs in prison-who it
involves, under what circumstances, and with what
been sexually assaulted." 42 U.S.C.

§ 15601(2) (Supp. III 2005).

62. Cindy Struckman-Johnson & David Struckman-Johnson, Sexual
Coercion Rates in Seven Midwestern PrisonFacilitiesfor Men, 80 PRISON J. 379,
383-85 (1994); ELSNER, supra note 13, at 62; see also Cindy Struckman-Johnson
et al., Sexual CoercionReported by Men and Women in Prison, 33 J. SEX RES. 67
(1996). Estimates of the frequency of rape victimization in prison vary from less
then 1 % to as high as 41%. See, e.g., WAYNE S. WOODEN & JAY PARKER, MEN
BEHIND BARS: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PRISON 126 (Plenum 1982) (estimating
41% victimization in the homosexual population); Richard Tewksbury,
Measures of Sexual Behavior in an Ohio Prison, 74 Soc. & Soc. RES 34, 38
(1989) (estimating less than 1% victimization).
63. Christopher Hensley et al., Examining the Characteristics of Male
Sexual Assault Targets in a Southern Maximum-Security Prison, 20 J. OF
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 667 (2005).
64. For a review of the academic research on this topic, see Christopher
Hensley & Richard Tewksbury, Inmate-to-Inmate Prison Sexuality: A Review of
Empirical Studies, 3 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 226 (2002); Christopher
Hensley et al., Introduction: The History of Prison Sex Research, 80 PRISON J.
360 (2000).
65. It is worth noting in this regard that even empirical research that
adheres to the view that rape is less common than sometimes perceived by the
public or other groups acknowledges the degree to which inmates perceive the
phenomenon as widespread. See, e.g., Christine A. Saum et al., Sex in Prison:
Exploring the Myths and Realities, 75 PRISON J. 413, 427 (1995).
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meaning attached. Despite the fantasies of some
reactionary commentators, who dismiss prison rape as just
deserts for convicted sex offenders or other easy targets of
contempt, who gets raped in prison has relatively little to
do with any code of retribution.6 6 Inmates who are weak,
either in their own physical or emotional constitution or as
measured by the politics of the institution, are the ones
likely to be raped. Gay inmates are at greater risk than
straight inmates, sex offenders (as well as non-violent
offenders) more than other offenders, and effeminate or
youthful inmates more than older and more masculine
inmates; but membership in one of these categories is by no
means a necessary condition of victimization.6 7 Far more
important is an inmate's relative strength or weakness,
both perceived and actual. The dynamics that define those
who rape these victims are even more complicated.
Strength of some sort-physical or institutional (for
example, high rank in a prison gang)-is, of course, a
prerequisite. Beyond this, offenders probably vary
considerably in background. 68 In stark confirmation of the

66. On this attitude, see, for example, Dan Bell, 'They Deserve It,' THE
July 10, 2006, at.18.

NATION,

67. Robert Dumond
inmates:

identifies

the following categories

of vulnerable

"(a) young, inexperienced; (b) physically small or weak; (c) inmates
suffering from mental illness and/or developmental disabilities; (d)
middle-class, not "tough" or "streetwise"; (e) not gang affiliated; (f)
known to be homosexual or overtly effeminate (if male); (g) convicted of
sex crimes; (h) violated the "code of silence" or "rats"; (i) disliked by
staff/other inmates; (j) previously sexually assaulted."
Robert W. Dumond, Inmate Sexual Assault: The Plague that Persists, 80 PRISON
J. 407, 408-09 (2000). See also HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN
U.S.
PRISONS
63-76
(2001),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html
[hereinafter No ESCAPE:
MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS]. On the greater vulnerability of gay inmates, see,
for example, WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 62, at 140-41, 224; Hensley et al.,
supra note 63 at 675-76; Peter L. Nacci & Thomas R. Kane, Sex and Sexual
Aggression in Federal Prisons: Inmate Involvement and Employee Impact, 48
FED. PROBATION 46, 47 (1984).
68. As a recent report by Human Rights Watch put it,
The characteristics of prison rapists are somewhat less clear and
predictable [than those of victims], but certain patterns can
nonetheless be discerned. First, although some older inmates commit
rape, the perpetrators also tend to be young, if not always as young as
their victims-generally well under thirty-five years old. They are
frequently larger or stronger than their victims, and are generally
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characterization of rape in the free world as an assertion of
power and privilege more than a fulfillment of sexual urges,
few if any perpetrators identify themselves as homosexual
outside of the prison context-a fact that also destroys the
myth of the "homosexual prison rapist."69 Indeed, it seems
clear that prison rape is motivated much more by the
psychology and sociology of power and control than by
sexual desire as such. Famed inmate-journalist Wilbert
Rideau quotes a top security official at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary at Angola:
Most of your homosexual rape is a macho thing.... It's basically one
guy saying to another: 'I'm a better man than you and I'm gonna
turn you out to prove it.' I've investigated about a hundred cases
personally, and I've not seen one that's just an act of passion. It's
definitely a macho/power thing the [sic] among inmates. And it's
the basically the insecure prisoners who do it. 70

Lending further support to this characterization of
prison rape is evidence that suggests that rape is an
important medium for the expression of interracial
conflict.71
Rape is, of course, a crime, even among prisoners. For
that population it is in fact doubly unlawful, as even
consensual sex among inmates is prohibited. And yet rape
in prison can be as much a reflection of semi-official
tolerance, even approval, as it is the simply inability of
more assertive, physically aggressive, and more at home in the prison
environment. They are "street smart"--often gang members. They have
typically been convicted of more violent crimes than their victims.
No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, supra note 67, at 63-64.
69. Id. at 64, 70. On prison rape as an expression of power, see id. at 96-98.
70. Wilbert Rideau, The Sexual Jungle in LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND
SuRvivAL BEHIND BARS 73, 75 (Wilbert Rideau & Ron Wikberg, eds., 1992). See
also SusAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 257-268
(1993).
71. Research on the demographics of prison rape reveals a higher rate of
interracial victimization than random chance alone would suggest, as well as
that victims are disproportionately white and offenders disproportionately
black. See Christopher Hensley et al., Characteristicsof Prison Sexual Assault
Targets in Male Oklahoma Correctional Facilities, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 595, 601-02 (2003); Struckman-Johnson & Struckman-Johnson, supra
note 62, at 386. There is also evidence to suggest a tendency of inmatesespecially blacks and Hispanics-to limit intra-racial abuse, at least insofar as
this involves members of their own group. No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S.
PRISONS, supra note 67, at 71-73.
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authorities to assert complete control over inmate
populations. 72 In some circumstances, it is clear that rape is
used by prison officials as a means of control in its own
right-as a means of punishing inmates who are (by the
officials' reckoning) especially troublesome, of breaking the
will of defiant inmates, and of rewarding
(by
accommodating their victimization of others) inmates who
73
are in some way helpful to the institution's interests.
Where rape is sanctioned in this fashion, a victimized
inmate has little hope of gaining the institution's protection
from further abuse. Even where it is not so sanctioned,
victims of rape often encounter considerable indifference on
the part of administrators and staff who would rather not
antagonize powerful rapists, who anticipate difficulties with
successful investigation, or who for some other reason
cannot be bothered. 74 Many staff simply may take the
position that defense against rapes and other assaults are
an inmate's own obligation. 75 Even where administrators
and staff are prepared to help, inmates who are raped face
another, in some respects more serious, impediment to
gaining their assistance: the very real threat of violent,
even fatal, retribution for being a "rat" or a "snitch."76 Such
realities underscore the special horrors that attend rape in
prison.
The circumstances of prison rape also vary in terms of
how the crime if perpetrated. A substantial percentage of
cases clearly involve rape in the strictest sense of the term:
the immediate use of force or threats of force to overcome
victims' resistance or non-consent. This is true, of course,
with gang rapes, which constitute a sizeable fraction of

72. A related problem is the apparent tendency of prison administrators to
underestimate the frequency with which inmates engage in sexual activity,
whether coercive or consensual, and to underestimate the degree to which
inmates live in fear of this fate. See Christopher Henley & Richard Tewksbury,
Wardens' Perceptions of Prison Sex, 85 PRISON J. 186 (2005); see also
Christopher Henley & Richard Tewksbury, Wardens' Perceptionsof Inmate Fear
of Sexual Assault: A Research Note, 85 PRISON J. 198 (2005)
73. See, e.g., ELSNER, supranote 13, at 70-71.
74. See, e.g., No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons, supra note 67, at 14356; ELSNER, supra note 13, at 63-72.
75. See SILBERMAN, supranote 19, at 19.
76. ELSNER, supranote 13, at 60-61; see also JEFFREY IAN Ross & STEPHEN C.
RICHARDS, BEHIND BARS: SURVIVING PRISON 72-74 (2002). On the dangers of
being labeled a snitch generally, see SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 33-34, 63, 71.
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these cases, as well as many single-offender rapes. 77 Other
prison rapes involve more subtle means of overcoming
victims' unwillingness, including wearing down a victim
with lesser threats over time or trading sex for protection
from third-party threats-some of which are invariably
staged for the occasion. 78 And still other cases involve the
exchange of sex for goods, privileges, and so forth-79
something that more closely resembles prostitution.
Rather than narrowing the range of what should be called
rape, these scenarios highlight the unique complexities of
sexual coercion within prison.8 0 Just as feminist critics have
questioned the volition that is supposed to characterize
prostitution,8 l those who research the prison rape
phenomenon have questioned whether any sexual
82
encounters in prison can be taken as truly consensual.
Given the omnipresence of violence and threats of violence
that inhere in prison,
consent can be quite difficult to
83
define-or withhold.
However it takes place, rape can be a one-time
experience for its victim, particularly if it occurs in jail,
among a transient population of inmates, or if a victim
overcome in a moment of weakness somehow later manages
to visit truly telling retribution on the perpetrator.8 4 For
many victims, though, being raped in prison becomes a
recurrent experience-a downward spiral, by which the
very fact of being raped stamps an inmate as weak and
vulnerable, which leads to further assaults, a further
77. No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, supra note 67, at 81-83, 85-87.
78. Id. at 87-89.
79. Id. at 82, 89.
80. For a review of these scenarios, see, for example, No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE
IN U.S. PRISONS, supra note 67, at ch. 5.
81. See, e.g., Melissa

Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural

Amnesia: What We Must Not Know in Order to Keep the Business of Sexual
Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109 (2006); see also

Joan Fitzpatrick, The Use of International Human Rights Norms to Combat
Violence Against Women, in HuMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 532 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994).
82. No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, supra note 67, at 81-98.
83. See, e.g., No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, supra note 67, at 8385.

84. This latter scenario is unlikely, given the way victims of prison rape are
typically chosen--"sized up"-fairly carefully for this inability and
unwillingness to resist or visit retribution on the perpetrator.
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diminution of standing, and so forth. 85 In some cases, this
culminates in the victim's consignment to a condition of
permanent sexual enslavement, marked by intensive
control, possession, even sale and purchase at the hands of
stronger inmates. 86 Needless to say, those who are the
victims of sexual assault in prison suffer not only physical
injury and loss of standing in the prison, but also deep
psychological trauma, including clinical depression 87and
anxiety, self-loathing, post traumatic stress, and anger.
These characteristics highlight prison rape's quality as
an extremely serious crime that can potentially befall
almost any inmate in any institution. To be sure, the risks
in any particular case are defined by a number of variables.
For one thing, not all prison administrators and staff are
callous or cynical in how they deal with rape.
Humanitarianism, professionalism, and perhaps fear of
legal liability inspire many to take the crime seriously-to
steer vulnerable inmates away from perpetrators, to punish
perpetrators, to rescue victims from further victimization,
and so forth. Likewise, the overall cultures of institutions,
as defined by architecture, racial composition, the presence
of gangs, and so forth, vary in their tolerance for rape and
their reliance on rape as an ordering device.88 Nevertheless,
there is a risk of being raped in every prison. And for every
prison that is relatively free of rape, there is one where the
situation is worse than average.
A similar point can be made about individual
circumstances. An inmate who is physically and
emotionally strong, does not have powerful enemies, and is
prepared to defend himself faces little immediate risk of
victimization. Indeed, an especially relevant factor in
determining whether an inmate will be targeted for abuse
is whether that inmate successfully projects an image of

85. No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, supra note 67, at 7-8;
SILBERMAN, supra note 19; see also Adam Liptak, Ex-Inmate's Suit Offers View

into Sexual Slavery in Prison,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at Al.
86. No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, supra note 67, at 90-95.
87. See CRAIG HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO
THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 183-84 (2005); HANS ToCH, LWING IN PRISON: THE
ECOLOGY OF SuRvIvAL 231-34, 274-80 (1992); No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S.
PRISONS, supra note 67, at ch. 6.

88. See Struckman-Johnson & Struckman-Johnson, supra note 62, at 386-
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courage, aggressiveness, and a willingness to fight.8 9
Successfully advertising these traits can go a longer way
than actual strength, physical or otherwise, in defining
whether an inmate will be marked for victimization. But
not all inmates are strong or capable of appearing strong,
and those who are strong one day can be weakened by
injury or illness (including mental illness) or by a change in
their political fortunes within the institution; if their
strength is only reputational, and not genuine, this can be
exposed and they can be transferred to a different
institution, the circumstances of which can suddenly
heighten their vulnerabilities. By any of these means, a
once-safe inmate can become a potential victim. Accounts
by rape victims feature a number of stories of inmates who
are initially able to resist but are eventually worn down,
manipulated, taken advantage of when sick, or otherwise
eventually conquered. 90 Ironically, too, under some
circumstances the appearance of strength can itself mark
an inmate as a tempting target for an offender or group of
offenders seeking to enhance their reputation. For all of
these reasons, no one facing prison can know with great
certainty that he will not be a victim of rape. 91
The fear of being raped runs deep in prison populations,
abetted by prisoners' own perceptions that prison rape is
even more common than it is in fact. 92 This reality, as
summarized by Mary Ellen Batiuk and Norman Smith, is
one in which,
[T]he threat of sexual violence actually
dominates the prison environment and
structures much of the everyday interaction
that goes on among inmates. In fact, the
89. See TOCH, supra note 87, at ch.9; No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS,
supra note 67, at 67-68.
90. See generally No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, supra note 67;
Wilbert Rideau, The Sexual Jungle in LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL
BEHIND BARS, supra note 70.
91. As Cindy and David Struckman-Johnson found in their research, "a

climate of fear about sexual assault dominate[s] the prison." StruckmanJohnson & Struckman-Johnson, supra note 362, at 386.
92. See Richard Tewksbury, Fear of Sexual Assault in Prison Inmates, 69
PRISON J., 62, 62 (1989). On inmates' tendencies to exaggerate the prevalence of
sexual assault, see, for example, Saum et al., supranote 65, at 423-24. See also
SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 15-16; TOCH, supranote 87, at 279.

20081

"LESS ELIGIBILITY"
threat of sexual victimization becomes the
dominant metaphor in terms of which almost
every other aspect of "prison reality" is
interpreted. 93

Notably, this depiction of prison rape accords with some
feminist accounts of how rape defines the social world of
women far beyond the spatial or temporal
boundaries, or
94
probabilities, of actual victimization.
For inmates, as for women in the free world, this
tendency to colonize existence with fear, anxiety, and a
consuming urge to embrace self-protective behavior is what
gives rape its power to define social structure. It has
already been mentioned that prison rape is more about
power and control than sexual desire. Powerful inmates
who rape their fellow prisoners derive from this a validation
of rank, privilege, and so forth. Similarly-and again, an
analogy can be drawn to the way rape might be said to
define the free world relationship between women and
men-even those powerful inmates who do not elect to
confirm their power by raping others inhabit a world in
which their status entails and is defined by a potential
prerogative to rape.
On the other side of this dynamic, virtually all inmates
see victimization as a fate that awaits one who is not
sufficiently vigilant and not sufficiently strong of mind and
body. In the words of penal psychologist Hans Toch, in the
ongoing process by which prison defines victims and
victimizers, rape "lurks... as the ultimate penalty, the most
95
extreme form of power that may be held over the victim."
To put this point differently (and here to depart from the
analogy to free world rape), it is not by accident that those
who escape being raped in prison are successful in this
regard, including those who are very strong. It is, rather,
because they participate successfully in an ongoing
discourse by which the surest way to avoid the violence of
93. Norman E. Smith & Mary Ellen Batiuk, Sexual Victimization and
Inmate Social Interaction,69 PRISON J. 29, 30 (1989).
94. See generally MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE
FEAR: THE SOCIAL COST OF RAPE (Univ. of Ill. Press 1991) (1989). See also
Wilbert Rideau, The Sexual Jungle in LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL
BEHIND BARS, supra note 70, at 73-74.

95. TOCH, supra note 87, at 188.
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being raped is to communicate a willingness to meet
violence with violence.
The dynamics of rape as just described are usually
thought to apply disproportionately to male inmates.
Female inmates have traditionally been thought to engage
only rarely in inmate-on-inmate sexual assault, and indeed
to engage in fewer assaults of all kinds. 96 However, recent
research has questioned this assumption, particularly with
regard to rape. 97 It may be that rapes have gone unnoticed
in this context, obscured perhaps by false suggestions of
consent. In any case, something that female inmates do face
with much greater frequency than males is the prospect of
being raped at the hands of prison guards and other
officials. This is, in fact, a very serious problem for women
in prison. 98 In some cases such misconduct involves outright
forcible rape; in others, the crime is accomplished by the
use of threats, intimidation, or promises of benefits to
manipulate inmates into unwanted sexual relationships. 99
Either way, the ability of prison employees to impose their
will on inmates is rooted in their ability to visit severe
retribution on those who resist or report their
victimization. 100
2. Non-Sexual Assaults. According to criminologists
Jeffrey Ross and Stephan Richards (who brings to bear his
own experience of eleven years as a prison inmate), "[s]hort
of being raped, the second greatest fear of prisoners is being
beaten, stabbed, or killed in the joint."'101 Such fear is wellfounded. Physical confrontation is a constant risk in prison,
often triggered by the smallest affront to another inmatean errant stare, a bump, anything of the sort. Such
encounters are frequently interpreted as overt challenges to
96. On this debate, see, for example, Kimberly R. Greer, The Changing
Nature of InterpersonalRelationships in a Women's Prison, 80 PRISON J. 442
(2000).
97. See Dyan McGuire, Violence as a Routine Feature of Prison Life for

Women: A QualitativeAssessment, 30 CORR.

COMPENDIUM,

July-Aug. 2005, at 1,

3-5, 36.

98. See generally, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE
OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS (1996).

99. See ELSNER, supra note 13, at 134-38.
100. See id. at 136-38; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL TOO FAMILIAR:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN INU.S. STATE PRISONS, supra note 98.
101. Ross & RICHARDS, supra note 76, at 115.
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an inmate's standing, as an expression of "disrespect."
Regardless of how it is initiated or by whom, failure to rise
to such a challenge can often constitute an enormous
mistake, as cowardice, timidity, even an air of reason or
humanity in the face of confrontation can mark a victim as
weak and put the inmate on a path to exploitation, rape,
even death. 10 2 As penologist Mathew Silberman put it,
"within the prison world, being willing to fight and, if
necessary to kill is essential to survival.' 10 3 Or in the words
of an administrator at a maximum security prison, "[y]ou
know it's a Catch 22 for inmates. [As an inmate] [y]ou've
got to fight at times. You've [either] got to have a huge
reputation built on4 the fact that you fought before or you've
got to fight now."'10
Defending oneself is also laden with risks, however.
This was evident to Sykes:
[T]he inmate is acutely aware that sooner or
later he will be "tested"-that someone will
"push" him to see how far they can go and that
he must be prepared to fight for the safety of
his person and his possessions. If he should
fail, he will thereafter be an object of
contempt, constantly in danger of being
attacked by other inmates who view him as an
obvious victim, as a man who cannot or will
not defend his rights. And yet if he succeeds,
he may well become a target for the prisoner
who wishes to prove himself, who seeks to
enhance his own prestige by defeating
the man
with a reputation for toughness. 10 5
To this it should be added that unless a victorious
inmate kills or seriously injures his adversary-which
present other, obvious problems-that adversary may well
attack him at some other time and place. In any case, a
beaten enemy may have allies among other inmates who
102. SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 14-41.

103. Id. at 28; see also id. at 36-37.
104. Quoted in LORNA A. RHODES, TOTAL CONFINEMENT: MADNESS AND
REASON IN THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 138 (2004).

105. SYKES, supranote 55, at 77-78.
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can extract vengeance in his behalf. In this world, as Sykes
describes it, "no man stands assured of [his] future."'106
Penologists continue to debate the immediate genealogy
of such violence, with competing camps arguing either that
violence is imported into prison or that the prison itself
cultivates violence. 107 Whatever the better side of this
argument-an issue that is irrelevant to the present
project-what is clear is the function that such violence
plays in prison. What makes non-sexual violence so
compulsory in today's prison is its prominent role, like that
of rape, in defining rank, hierarchy, and all-around social
standing. This is not simply done in some abstract fashion,
but by the way assault defines, on the one hand, who will
play the role of victim and be a source of exploitation and
an object through which others confirm their social
superiority and, on the other hand, not only who will play
the role of exploiter, but who will enjoy even the privilege of
being left alone. To connect this observation to the earlier
discussion of the evolution of prison, it might be said that
violence is so ubiquitous in 08
prison precisely because it
governs the prison in this way.
Like the data on rape, the official data on non-sexual
assault in prisons and jails are both inadequate and, in
some ways, highly misleading. This dearth of reliable data
reflects some of the same problems that hamper research on
prison rape. In particular, inmates' fear that reporting
assaults is likely to expose them to retribution as well as a
loss of the very standing that is at stake in such a conflict.
Equally important is the failure of many administrators to
investigate and catalogue assaults that come to their
attention, particularly if they do not result in serious injury,
involve powerful inmates who could cause even greater
problems if disciplined, present some difficulty in
investigating, or might possibly result in administrative
hassles or civil liability. These problems are reflected, not
only in a disparity between official data and other

106. Id. at 78.
107. For a review of competing theories surrounding this issue, see, for
example, Shanhe Jiang & Marianne Fisher-Giorlando, Inmate Misconduct: A
Test of the Deprivation, Importation, and Situational Models, 82 PRISON J. 335,
338-42 (2002).
108. See SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 74-75.
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sources, 10 9 but also in otherwise inexplicable variations in
the figures reported by different institutions and
jurisdictions.110
In any case, while there is some evidence to suggest
that the frequency of fistfights in prison is reduced by a
pervasive fear that this could to lead to more serious, even
lethal combat,111such fights are not uncommon, with as
many as half of inmates reporting engaging in them. 112 In
only a relatively few cases do such encounters actually lead
to homicides, particularly in recent times as administrators
have managed to effect dramatic reductions in violent
deaths in prisons and jails. 113 But stabbings, bludgeonings,
and other serious assaults remain fairly commonplace.
a
Official data for 2000, which inevitably excludes 114
significant number of attacks that were never reported,
indicate 34,355 inmate-on-inmate assaults in state and
federal prisons." 5 Another authority identifies 7,797
inmate-on-inmate assaults in that year that resulted in
injuries requiring medical attention. 116 Moreover, research

109. This disparity was highlighted in one of the early empirical studies of
the prevalence of non-sexual assaults. In their study of assaults in the North
Carolina prison system in the early 1970s, Dan Fuller and Thomas Orsagh
found a significant disparity between official rates of assault and rates
calculated from inmates' accounts. Dan A. Fuller & Thomas Orsagh, Violence
and Victimization Within a State PrisonSystem, 2 CRIM. JUSTICE REV. 35 (1977).
110. See, e.g., JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH,
CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND
ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 24-25 (2006).
111. See SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 37. This is not to say that fistfights
and such do not occur in prison-they do, but with a recognition that they could
easily escalate into lethal combat. See id. at 54.
112. See, e.g., SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 92 ("[Mlore than half of all
inmates reported engaging in some sort of violence, including fistfights, with
fellow inmates.").
113. The dramatic decline in rates of homicide and well as suicide in prisons
and jails over the last several decades is one of the few unqualifiedly positive
achievements in contemporary prison and jail administration. See MUMOLA,
supranote 50.
114. On the difficulties inherent in accounting non-sexual assaults in
prison, see, for example, David R. Eichenthal & Laurel Blatchford, Prison
Crime in New York State, 77 PRISON J. 456, 457-58 (1997).
115. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE
AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2000, 9-10 tbl. 16 (2003).
116. CAMILLE GRAHAM CAMP & GEORGE M.
YEARBOOK, 2001: ADULT SYSTEMS 53 (2002).

CAMP,

THE
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by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in the 1990s revealed
that some 10% of state prison inmates had been injured in a
fight. 117 This data is confirmed by recent surveys of New
York state prisons (which are not regarded as especially
violent), conducted by the Correctional Association of New
York, which reveal high rates of "confrontation" among
inmates, with over half of some populations reporting a
118
past conflict with another inmate.
A conscious awareness among inmates that they could
be drawn into such conflict at almost any time is a defining
feature of the prison experience. 119 Aware of what is at
stake, prisoners spend considerable time and psychic
energy identifying potentially dangerous situations and
planning to avoid them or, if that is not possible, to
negotiate them with the least possible risk of injury to
physical body or reputation. 120 For Sykes, this situation
creates a widespread experience among inmates of "acute
anxiety," defined by uncertainty as to what will happen and
whether one will muster an adequate response when it
does. 121 There is no reason to think this dynamic is any less
true for inmates today than it was when Sykes performed
his study. 122 Prison culture today puts an even greater
emphasis on "toughness" and on an inmate's willingness to
resort to "extremes of violence. '123
In fact, American prisons house hundreds of thousands
of inmates who suffer some form of mental illness. 124 This
117. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL
PROBLEMS OF INMATES, 1997, 1, 4-6 (2001) [hereinafter MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF
INMATES].
118. See CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., GREEN HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 13-14

(2006) [hereinafter GREEN HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY]; CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y.,
UPSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 11 (2006) [hereinafter UPSTATE CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY].
119. See, SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 82.

120. Interestingly, one of the more salient accounts of this conflict-avoidance
dynamic is drawn from the context of a women's prison. McGuire, supra note
97, at 4-5, 36.
121. SYKES, supra note 55, at 78.
122. See, SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at 14-41, 61-78.

123. Id. at 35.
124. In fact, as of 2005, over half of inmates manifested a "mental health
problem." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006) [hereinafter MENTAL
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES].
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condition, which reflects a de facto policy of using
incarceration to deal with mental illness among the poor as
well as shortcomings in the provision of mental health
treatment in prison, 125 exacerbates the problem of prison
violence in two ways. First, it increases assaults against
inmates by fellow prisoners and staff alike, as the mentally
ill find themselves unable to manage the threat of violence
from other inmates or to comply adequately with orders
from prison staff. 126 Second, such people often become
assailants themselves, as their sense of127reality is distorted
and their facility for self-control decays.
The cruel dilemmas surrounding violence can be
exacerbated in an institution dominated, as many are, by
gangs. Outwardly organized along racial and regional lines,
such organizations are also often heavily involved in
protection rackets, prostitution, the sale of contraband, and
other criminal enterprises. 128 Prison gangs sometimes
compel disinterested inmates to choose sides during periods
of conflict, which can unwittingly embroil an inmate in
cycles of violence. They can also convert gang rivalries into
larger-scale racial conflicts. 129 Perhaps even more
problematically for the typical inmate-given that actual
membership in or affiliation with prison gangs may be
lower than anecdotal evidence sometimes suggests-is the
fact that such gangs often are responsible for catalyzing
130
waves of inmate violence and institutional retribution.
125. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 16-25 (2003) [hereinafter ILL-EQUIPPED].
126. See id. at 56-59, 80, 82-86. According to data from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, more than one-third of prison inmates experience "persistent
anger or irritability" and a significant number experience delusions or other
psychotic symptoms. MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES,

supra note 124, at 2-3.
127. See ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 125, at 39-42, 58-60.
128. On the prevalence of gangs in contemporary prisons, see, for example,
Chad R. Trulson, et al., Gang Suppression and Institutional Control, 68 CORR.
TODAY 26 (2006); See also Ann Scott Tyson, Prison Threat: Gangs Grab More
Power, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 15, 1997, at 1.

129. For example, for years the Los Angeles County Jail has been fraught
with violence along racial lines, beneath which are gang conflicts. See, e.g.,
Darryl Fears, 'Like Living in Hell,'L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, at B1.
130. As Silberman writes, "even when gang membership is small, the gangs
tend to dominate the inmate power structure." SILBERMAN, supranote 19, at 28.
For an empirical argument that gang membership and affiliation is causally
related to higher rates of prison violence, see Gerald G. Gaes et al., The
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Another kind of violence that inmates face is assault by
prison guards. A prerogative to violence is encoded in the
legal license that prison officials enjoy to use reasonable
force to compel inmates to obey their lawful commands, to
protect persons or property, and generally to manage their
institutions in an orderly and safe manner. An inmate who
refuses an order related to this prerogative invites a violent
response, one that may go well beyond what is required to
ensure his or her compliance. Indeed-and this highlights
the second way in which violence inheres
in
imprisonment-the sociology of the prison itself generates a
tendency among many guards to accomplish their functions
in a violent fashion. To a considerable degree, guards too
are drawn into the culture of violence that permeates the
prison and that allocates authority in accordance with one's
willingness to resort to violence. A guard who fails to
project this image faces heightened risks of victimization by
inmates as well as loss of esteem (and possibly support) in
the eyes of coworkers. 3 1 In other cases, staff-on-inmate
violence may be still more nefarious-for example,
motivated by racism, criminal aims, or interpersonal
disagreement. However it originates, such violence can
assume brutal, even sadistic proportions.
Violence by guards can of course be lawful or unlawful,
as defined by whether it constitutes reasonable and
appropriate use of force to compel an inmate to obey a
lawful command, to protect persons or property, or to
maintain order. 132 A neat enough distinction on paper, the
line between lawful and unlawful force can be blurry in
actual practice, especially as perceived by the inmate. In a

Influence of Prison Gang Affiliation on Violence and Other Prison Misconduct,
82 PRISON J. 359 (2002).

131. For a thoughtful account of the complexities of guarding prison
inmates, including the importance of adhering to informal norms, see TED
CONOVER, NEWJACK: GUARDING SING SING (2001). See also Mathew Purdy,

Prison's Violent Culture Enveloping Its Guards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at
Al, B8.
132. For a discussion of the degree of force staff may use to accomplish this,
see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). On the prerogative of prison staff to
use force in self-defense or in defense of others, see, for example, Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 453
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971). On their right to use force to enforce prison rules, see, for
example, Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). On the right to use
force to prevent escape, see, for example, Henry v. Perry, 866 F. 2d 657 (3d Cir.
1989).
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context where staff enjoy prerogatives to regulate
essentially all aspects of inmate life, and where such
prerogatives may be articulated formally or informally, and
by different people at different times, an inmate may well
face confusing, even contradictory commands. Moreover, in
such a context, disobedience can easily constitute a pretext
for the use of force. Nor does an inmate need to be a
"problem" to be beaten by guards. He or she may have the
misfortune to cross the wrong person, which they may do
even by asserting their legal rights; he or she may be the
victim of collective punishment or mistaken identity; or he
or she may (as for example, in responding to a physical
challenge by another inmate, or in refusing to bear witness
against another inmate) find himself or herself compelled
by the brutal realities of the prison experience to flout
prison rules or to defy the orders of a guard. In any of these
ways, inmates with no desire to create trouble may find
themselves the object of prison guards' wrath.
While attempts to determine the frequency of such
assaults run up against the same impediments as those
that focus on other kinds of prison abuse, 133 and while the
phenomenon varies among, and even within, institutions, it
is clear that beatings are not uncommon in contemporary
134
prisons. Academic studies support this characterization,
as do reports by human rights organizations, 135 accounts by
journalists, 136 and more than a few reported judicial
133. For example, at several of the institutions recently surveyed by the
Correctional Association of New York, a high proportion of inmates reported
abstaining from filing complaints against guards for fear of retaliation. See, e.g.,
CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., ATTICA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 4-5 (2005) [hereinafter
ATTICA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY]; CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., AUBURN CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY 3 (2005); CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., ELMIRA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 4-5
(2005); GREEN HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, supra note 118, at 13.
134. See, e.g., SILBERMAN, supra note 19; Hans Toch, Hypermasculinity and
Prison Violence, in MASCULINITIES AND VIOLENCE 168 (Lee H. Bowker ed., 1998).
135.

See, e.g.,

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS

FOR ALL 32-49 (1998); GIBBONS & Katzenbach, supra note 110; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
REPORT (1991). 136. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, Prison Chief Encouraged Brutality, Witnesses
Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A12; Holly J. Burkhalter, Barbarism
Behind Bars: Torture in U.S. Prisons, THE NATION, July 3, 1995, at 17; Purdy,
supra note 131 (describing seventeen brutality cases against guards at one
prison that were either won at trial or settled in the plaintiffs' favor between
1990 and 1995); Jill Riepenhoff, Two Guards Charged in Inmate's Beating, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 1998, at B1; John Sullivan, New Jersey Set To
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decisions. 137 This characterization is also supported by
detailed surveys of New York prisons by the Correctional
Association of New York, mentioned earlier, which reveal
evidence of widespread and pervasive physical abuse of
inmates by prison workers, even at some of that state's
model institutions. 1 38 Indeed, at some institutions the
Associations' researchers found that eighty percent or more
of inmates felt "unsafe" in the face of abuse and threats of
abuse by guards. 139
3. Disturbances. Yet another category of violence in
prison, which can often transcend the usual inmate-oninmate/staff-on-inmate dichotomy, comprises "disturbances"
involving multiple inmates-what have been called in the
literature, acts of "collective" as opposed to interpersonal
violence. 140 These may consist of fights involving several or
more inmates, melees implicating inmates and correctional
staff, and, in their most essential form, full scale riots
involving dozens or more inmates who wrest control of the
institution. Data from 2000 and 2001 identify hundreds of
reported "altercation[s] involving three or more inmates,
resulting in official action beyond summary sanctions,"
involving approximately 7,860 inmates-and this is just a
partial total, as not every jurisdiction reported, and some
Investigate Inmates' Claims Of Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003, at B1, B5;
Videotape of Prison Beating Prompts F.B.I. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1997, at D17 (describing widespread beatings and dog attacks at a Texas
prison).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2005)
(convicting jail guards of violating the civil rights of an inmate they beat and
kicked); United States v. Lambright, 320 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2003) (convicting
prison guard of violating the civil rights of an inmate he beat to death in a cell);
United States v. Velazquez, 246 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2001) (convicting prison
guards of criminal deprivation of civil rights and conspiracy in connection with
the beating death of an inmate); Grimm v. Lane, 895 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Ohio
1995) (deciding a civil rights lawsuit by inmates severely beaten in apparent
retaliation for escape attempt).
138. See Green HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, supra note 118, at 10-13; see
also ATTICA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, supra note 133, at 4-5; CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y.,
PRISON VISITING COMM., STATE OF THE PRISONS 2002-2003: CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT IN 14 NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 33-35 (2005);

UPSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, supra note 118, at 9-11.
139. GREEN HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, supra note 118, at 11; see also

FACILITY, supra note 118, at 11 (noting that over half of
inmates "frequently feel very unsafe").
UPSTATE CORRECTIONAL

140. Bottoms, supra note 14 at 205-07.
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that did used
more exacting criteria to define an
"altercation."'141 Although they are a defining feature of the
prison in the post-"corrections" era, full scale riots are fairly
uncommon. Still, during the same time frame, 2000 to 2001,
jurisdictions reported about ten "forcible attempt[s] to gain
control of a facility," of which half were described as "gangrelated."'142 Moreover, the infrequency of prison riots has to
be qualified when judging their significance by the stunning
degree of mayhem that they can cause. The 1971 uprising
at New York's Attica Correctional Facility resulted in the
death of 39 inmates and guards, mostly at the hands of
authorities; the 1980 riot at New Mexico's State
Penitentiary at Santa Fe left 33 inmates dead, mainly
supposed "snitches" who were tortured and killed by fellow
inmates; in 1986, rioting prisoners in a West Virginia
prison killed three alleged snitches from their ranks; and in
1993, nine prisoners and a guard were killed in an Ohio
prison riot. 143 Only a few years ago, guards at California's
Pelican Bay State Prison shot thirteen inmates during a
riotous fight along racial lines among some 260 prisoners. 144
In each of these cases, many other inmates were beaten,
stabbed, and sometimes raped. These are but the most
notorious among many other, often deadly riots145to occur in
American prisons over the last several decades.
141. Riots, Disturbances, Violence, Assaults and Escapes, CORRECTIONS
COMPENDIUM, May 2002, at 6, 11-14 [hereinafter Disturbances];see also CENSUS
OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2000, supra note 82 at 10

tbl.16 (describing 606 "major disturbances"-those
inmates-for the year 2000).
142. Disturbances,supranote 141, at 6, 15-17.

involving five or more

143. See, BERT USEEM & PETER KIMBALL, STATES OF SIEGE: U.S. PRISON

RIOTS, 1971-1986 (Oxford 1991); The Attica Revolt: Hour by Hour, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1971, at 1; Pamala G. Hollie, Officers Recapture New Mexico Prison
Without Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1980, at Al; Ronald Smothers, 2 Bodies
Found in Ohio Prison Debris, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at A14; William K.
Stevens, Riot in Prison Ends in Relief and a Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1986 at
17.
144. Inmate Dies and 12 Are Hurt as Riot Erupts in CaliforniaPrison, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at A14.

145. See, e.g., 1 Dead in Large Riot at CaliforniaPrison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2006, at 22; 16 Hurt as Maryland Prison Riot is Quelled, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
1991, at 26; 200 Officers Storm Prison in Pittsburgh to End Riot, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 28, 1987, at A18; At Least 13 Injured as Inmates Riot in Puerto Rico, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1988, at A30; Guards Quell Riot at CaliforniaPrison,N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2001, at A32; Michael deCourcy Hinds, Rioters Destroy Nearly Half the

Building in a PennsylvaniaPrison, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1989, at 9; Inmate Dies
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As the number of casualties just mentioned suggests,
disturbances of this kind can easily entangle an inmate in
serious violence, with the risk of death or serious injury.
Beyond this, such episodes of their very nature constitute
challenges to the authority of the institution; they are, in
Anthony Bottoms' words, representative of "a significant
breakdown in the normal patterns of social order in an
institution." 146 As such, they are destabilizing, and for this
reason can bring about lasting reverberations of
interpersonal violence, including both inmate-on-inmate
assaults as well as retributive assaults by staff on inmates,
as actors on both sides of the bars seek to reassert authority
and standing. Major disturbances are also almost certain to
result in policy changes by the institution, in the guise of
heightened security, that aggravate the articulation of
violence by formal, structural means. 147 It is worth recalling
in this regard that the "supermax" prison concept arose out
of unrest at the United States Penitentiary at Marion,
Illinois, in 1983, which had left two guards dead. 148
4. A World of Violence. The prison is, above all, a
"world of violence"-to use Silberman's apt phrase. 149 As
the foregoing description reveals, this is true on multiple
levels. It is true in the relatively direct sense that many
inmates are raped, many more are assaulted in other ways,
and most all inmates face some risk of assault, even if not
immediate. It is also true in a different, more universal and
more fundamental sense-in the sense that violence is the
dominant mode of discourse in prison life. It is the medium
by which inmates define their place in the social order of
the prison. This manifests itself in a very immediate way
for victims and perpetrators: to be a victim of violence,
especially a passive victim, confirms weakness, inadequacy,
and 8 are Hurt as Riot Erupts in CaliforniaPrison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000,
at A14; Inmate is Killed at Illinois Prison: Disturbance Leaves 3 Guards
Injured, One Critically, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at B7; Inmate Killed in Riot
at California Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1989, at A10; John T. McQuiston,
Dozens are Injured in FurtherOutbreak of Rikers I. Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1990, at Al; Ronald Sullivan, 7 Stabbed and 5 Others Hurt in Rikers Clash,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1994 at B3.
146. Bottoms, supra note 14, at 206.
147. BERT USEEM ET AL., RESOLUTION OF PRISON RIOTS: STRATEGIES AND

POLICIES 223 (1995).
148. ELSNER, supra note 13, at 141.
149. SILBERMAN, supra note 19.
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and ultimately inferiority; and to successfully inflict
violence or to wrest concessions by the threat of violence
confirms entitlement, superiority, and the prerogative to
dominate. But it is also true in an indirect but even more
comprehensive way-in the sense that all inmates must
invoke violence and the threat of violence more or less
continuously, if only to earn the right
to abstain from the
role of either victim or perpetrator. 150
Ironically, at the same time that this account stresses
the importance of violence in prison, it also contradicts a
popular image of prisons as utterly awash in violence, if not
simply out of control. This image is manifestly false, as
indicated by statistics and other indicia cited above. But it
is false in a way that actually abets the critique of prison
violence undertaken in this Article. First, more than simply
being false and open to smug refutation by defenders of the
status quo, the exaggeration of prison violence serves to
obscure the real importance of violence in the contemporary
prison. Once prisons are seen as utterly awash in violence,
they begin to contradict, both functionally and conceptually,
the concept of the prison as prison-that is, as a place of
structured, orderly, and socially-sanctioned punishment.
Conveniently, then, the violence that constitutes this
condition assumes a deviant quality vis-a-vis established
norms of crime and punishment. Second, where violence is
revealed, as it is here, as a normal feature of prison life,
commonplace without being utterly ubiquitous, and
integrated in subtle ways with its everyday practices to the
point of being mundane, a very different sense of its
meaning can emerge. Recognizing the normalcy of prison
violence in this fashion allows one to perceive its true role
as constitutive of the social order of the prison and to judge
it, not as an affront to the prison as prison, but as an
integral means by which the prison actually advances its
punitive agenda.
In order fully to appreciate the meaning of violence in
prison, it is helpful to reflect on several aspects of prison
that amplify violence's effects. Two such aspects are
underscored by Lorna Rhodes, in a striking ethnography of
a maximum security prison.' 51 Rhodes' narrative
emphasizes how the very institutions of security and control
150. See generally TOCH, supra note 87.
151. See RHODES, supra note 104, at 55-60.
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that pervade the contemporary prison repress and constrain
the entire universe of social intercourse, thereby condensing
the meaning of overt violence and emphasizing its special
significance as a mode of self-definition and defiance within
the prison. The more the prison is subject to the rigidities
of control and security, the more important violence
becomes in opposition to such means, as a way that inmates
and staff alike continue to assert hierarchy and standing.
Rhodes' observations invite a similar point about the
intense levels of inactivity and boredom that flow from the
dynamics of security and control. 152 In opposition to such
conditions, violence stands out even more as a medium of
sovereignty, spontaneity, and of deviation from security and
control-and as such, all the more fundamental to defining
hierarchies, prerogatives, and overall social standing in
ways that are not predefined bureaucratically. It is in
precisely this sense that the relationship
between violence
153
and "respect" reveals its foundations.
Another aspect of the prison that heightens the impact
of violence within it walls is the fact that there is quite
literally no escape from the violence that arises within. An
inmate obviously cannot even contemplate fleeing entirely
from the zone of danger. Moreover, there is seldom any
refuge within prison. 154 Even if possible, to extract oneself
from the immediate environs of a challenge or threat risks a
concession of stature and further victimization. Seeking
out protection or sympathy is not a good option either.
Doing so will often only further confirm, and may well
aggravate, the loss of stature that attends the assault
itself. 155 And the request may well fall on deaf ears. Or,
even if it triggers intervention, such an appeal may result
in removal to a place of continued, even aggravated risk, or
to a place of safety that nonetheless subjects the inmate to
unbearable levels of control and isolation in some kind of
protective custody. Such is one aspect in the interplay of
passive and overt violence in the prison experience.
152. See generally id. (discussing how the monotony of prison life impacts
those incarcerated).
153. See id. at 61-95 (discussing how boredom triggers violence in
prisoners).
154. See TOCH, supra note 87, at 279.
155. Even inmates who complain about assaults and gain transfer to other
institutions often find that their reputation as victim precedes them, setting
them up for further victimization.
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C. The Indifference of "DeliberateIndifference" and Other
Contradictionsof Legal Right in the Context of Prison
Violence
If this world of violence prevailed in defiance of a legal
regime that was well-designed to eliminate violence and
that was actually deployed to that end, it would be difficult
to interpret this condition by the logic of less eligibility. For
less eligibility contemplates punishment as policy, if only of
a tacit kind. In fact, the law adopts a distinctly
contradictory approach to prison violence characterized, on
the one hand, by its formal condemnation of prison violence,
but on the other, by a significant degree of indifference to
violence on a practical level. This approach is entirely
compatible with a view of prison violence as integral to the
social function of the prison. In it can be seen the law's
functions in obscuring and rationalizing prison violence,
negating it in a formal and juridical sense, casting it as
anomalous and deviant when it does manifest itself, while
allowing it to reign relatively unimpeded. By this means,
the law denies that violence is part of the logic of
punishment while presenting itself to would-be critics of
prison violence as an appropriate focus point of reform. All
of this distracts from a critical understanding of the prison
violence problem.

1. The Decline and Resurgence of the "Hands-Off'
Approach. To a considerable degree, the contradictory
relationship between prison violence and the law comprises
one aspect of a broader conflict about the legal right of
prisoners to challenge their conditions of confinement. Until
the 1960s, courts routinely cited doctrinal concerns, like
separation of powers and lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
as well as practical concerns about their own competency in
penological matters and worries about the effects of
litigation on prison discipline, to justify a "hands off'
approach to suits filed by inmates. 156 While never a formal
doctrine in its own right, the hands-off approach effectively
denied inmates the opportunity to adjudicate claims
regarding their treatment in prison. 157 It also reflected a

156. See JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS' RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 64-65 (2001); SILBERMAN, supra note 19, at
110-11.
157. See JOHN A. FLITER, supra note 157.
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general reluctance of courts to assert jurisdiction over
matters involving prison life, and a general tendency of
authorities in all branches of government to defer to the
administrative and policy choices of prison officials.
Courts retreated from the hands-off approach in the
1960s and early 1970s. Particularly important in this
regard were several Supreme Court cases in the early
1960s: United States v. Muniz, in which the Court endorsed
the right of an inmate to sue the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act; 158 and Cooper v. Pate, in which the
Court recognized the right of prisoners to sue their keepers
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.159 These cases
ushered in a brief period, lasting through much of the
1970s, during which inmates used expanded access to the
courts to challenge conditions of confinement on a broad
front, encompassing
issues
like access
to legal
representation and law libraries, visitation policies, a host
of religious practices, racial segregation, as well as health
16 0
care, diet, and other physical aspects of accommodation.
Perhaps the high-water mark in this trend came with the
courts' endorsement of a test of the constitutionality of
conditions of confinement that looked to the "totality 6of1
conditions" experienced by inmates in an institution.
Though they did not banish violence from prison-which, as
we have seen, was actually escalating during this timethese cases did help bring about substantial improvements
in many other aspects of prison life.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s courts were broadly
reconsidering this relatively liberal attitude towards inmate
rights. Courts began in effect to resuscitate the hands-off
doctrine, bringing back limits on inmates' access to the
courts and invoking other procedural and substantive
barriers to effective legal challenges to prison conditions.
This shift, which continued through the 1980s and 1990s,
158. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
159. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
160. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (discussing the right to
be free of cruel and unusual punishments); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974) (discussing the right to due process in disciplinary proceedings); Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (discussing the right to free exercise of religion);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (discussing the right of access to the
courts).
161. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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was marked by Supreme Court decisions rejecting inmates'
challenges to searches on privacy grounds, 162 limiting
prisoners' access to legal literature, 163 limiting visitation
rights, 164 narrowing prisoners First Amendment rights in
the religious context, 165 upholding the practice of doublecelling inmates, 166 and weakening inmates' due process
protections in disciplinary hearings. 167 In making these
determinations, the courts made clear that, while they are
not entirely beyond the realm of constitutional protection,
prisoners only enjoy such constitutional rights as are
consistent with "legitimate penological interests";168 and
that in determining what those interests are, courts must
generally defer to the discretion of prison officials, granting
them wide deference in fashioning and implementing
penological policies. 169
Critics of this resurrection of the hands-off approach
have pointed out its conspicuous correspondence with a
precipitous rise in both the overall number of prisoners and
the proportion of them who are black or Hispanic, raising
the possibility that the politics of race have factored into the
change in jurisprudence. 170 This claim coheres with a point
developed later in this section: that the rise and fall of
prisoners' rights are connected historically with the logic of
less eligibility and the deterioration of social conditions of
those subject to confinement. The shift back to the hands-off
approach represents in juridical form the more practical
dynamic of violence as a mode of punishment.
2. The Legal Regulation of Violence in Prison Under
162. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
163. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
164. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
165. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
166. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979).
167. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
168. E.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415 n.13 (1989).
169. See, e.g., Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352. The Supreme Court has made clear,
in fact, that prison officials are under no obligation to choose policies that are
the least restrictive of prisoners' constitutional rights. Turner, 482 U.S. at 9091.
170. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Impunity: Sexual Abuse in Women's Prisons,
42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45, 81 (2007).
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Contemporary Law. Notwithstanding the return of the
hands-off approach, contemporary law nominally prohibits
prison violence in a number of ways. It provides grounds for
both civil and criminal liability of those who commit prison
violence, whether they are inmates or their keepers, as well
as prison staff and administrators who are aware of or who
tolerate violence against inmates, even where they are not
directly involved in the violence itself. Likewise, inmates
who are the victims of prison violence may be able to enjoin
such violence or the conditions that facilitate it. Such
potential for liability and equitable relief is rooted in a
number of provisions of federal and state law: federal
constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; tort liability
under traditional state law doctrine; and criminal liability
under both traditional state law doctrines as well as more
specialized provisions of federal and state law.
On the surface, these regimes constitute an impressive
bulwark against prison violence, one that in seemingly
rational and humane ways balances prisoners' rights
against the necessary concomitants of custody, and that
seems to defy the recent trend away from the legal
protection of prisoners just described. In fact though, their
true significance is thoroughly undermined by important, if
sometimes subtle, constructions in substantive and
procedural law, and in particular by the way these
constructions interact with the practical realities of prison
life and administration. While such realities do not
completely emasculate the law, they seriously diminish the
ability of the law to actually restrain, deter, or punish
prison violence.
Nowhere is the compromise of ostensibly expansive
formal rights by means of limiting constructions of law
more evident than in the effort to police prison violence by
invoking the United States Constitution. The Constitution
is uniquely relevant in framing the rights of prisoners, in
that every aspect of prisoners' lives is controlled by the
state and implicates the constitutional limits of state
action. 171 The key provision in this context is the Eighth
Amendment, which governs claims involving prison
conditions generally, as well as prison violence. 172 On its

171. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
172. The vast majority of all prisoner complaints under the Constitution
involve the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking
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face alone, the amendment would seem to function as a
broad condemnation of prison violence: what could be more
cruel and unusual, as measured by "contemporary
standards of decency"' 73-the
standard of Eighth
Amendment law-than to suffer an unprovoked beating or
rape? Indeed, the Eighth Amendment has been construed
broadly to protect inmates from rapes, assaults, and other
acts of violence in prison. It is in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment that the Supreme Court has disclaimed the
notion that prison violence constitutes "part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society."'174 Nevertheless, both the Supreme Court and
lower courts have been quick, too, to qualify the
implications of these basic propositions with limiting
language, noting on separate occasions that the amendment
"does not mandate comfortable prisons,"'175 and that it does
not prohibit cruel and unusual
conditions but, rather, cruel
176
and unusual punishments.
More than simple dicta, these pronouncements accord
with a number of restrictive interpretations that the courts
have imposed on both the substantive meaning of the
Eighth Amendment and the all-important procedural
means by which it can be enforced to actually remediate or
deter prison violence. Part of the problem is that, as
constrained by the state action doctrine, the Eighth
Amendment can only apply to prison violence derivatively.
It does not condemn assaults directly but rather only where
prison administrators or staff are responsible for causing
such violence or suffering it to occur. Defined in these
terms, the rights guaranteed by the amendment (as well as
other provisions of the Constitution) are enforceable as civil
actions for damages or equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which contemplates liability where individuals are
deprived of their constitutional rights by persons acting

Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S.ILL. U. L.J. 417,
457 (1993).
173. This qualifier is central to courts' construction of the Eighth
Amendment. E.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).

174. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10
(1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517 (1984); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97.
175. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
176. See Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1031 (7th Cir. 1994).
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"under color of law."'177 But the courts have imposed very
important limits on such use of the statute in such cases.
For one thing, they have made clear that damage actions
under § 1983 cannot proceed directly against states as
states. While municipalities (which often run jails, but
seldom prisons) can be directly sued for damages, damage
actions under the statute can only be brought against state
officials in their personal capacity. 178 Moreover, individuals
sued under § 1983 may well enjoy the benefits of the
doctrine of qualified immunity, which precludes the
imposition of liability for damages on defendants who
exercise a discretionary function in an objectively
reasonable manner and in good faith-even where this

177. The statute in its entirety reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The United
State Supreme Court ruled more than forty years ago that state inmates could
bring suit under this statute to challenge their conditions of confinement.
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973). By its literal terms, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 appears to exclude federal prison
workers from liability. They may, however, be liable under the statute to the
same extent as state officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Claims involving religious freedom,
political expression and association, privacy, and due process may also be
enforced via
§ 1983. See Sadin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Hudson, 503
U.S. at 1; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987).
178. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A municipality's
liability under § 1983 is generally limited to cases in which the actions of its
officers or agents accord with official policy or custom, or reflect "deliberate
indifference" on the part of one charged with making for the entity policy. See,
e.g., Ali v. District of Columbia, 278 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Scott v. Moore, 114
F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997). Damage actions against a state directly or against a
state officer in her or his official capacity are deemed prohibited by the
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
64-70 (1989); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978).
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manifestly violates a prisoner's constitutional rights. 179 It
should be noted, too, that before even filing a § 1983 claim,
a prisoner is required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
18 0
(the PLRA) to exhaust available administrative remedies.
Furthermore, under the PLRA prisoners who have filed
three of more suits in forma pauperis that were "dismissed
on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or
fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,"
may not file further suits in forma pauperis "unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical"
harm. 181
Just as important as these procedural hurdles in
limiting the availability of constitutional claims to check
prison violence are substantive prerequisites of § 1983
liability imposed by the courts. Prisoners may sue under §
1983 for assaults committed against them by prison
administrators or staff. In such a case, the "core judicial
inquiry," according to the Supreme Court, is "whether force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause [the
inmate] harm."'1 2 To some degree, this test applies in such
cases in a straightforward and not altogether ungenerous
fashion. But it is not without complication, one area of
which concerns the type and degree of force required to
make out a viable claim. While the Supreme Court in the
1992 decision, Hudson v. McMillian, has made clear that
'"serious" injury is not necessarily required to establish
liability, 8 3 several cases
underscore
a continued
willingness of lower courts to dismiss claims involving

179. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Some actors, in particular judges, prosecutors,
legislators, and witnesses, enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability. See,
e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a) (2000). Notably, this requirement applies even
where the administrative body is not authorized to tender the remedy sought in
the § 1983 claim. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Nearly all § 1983 suits by inmates are filed in
forma pauperis. See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights
Cases and the Provisionof Counsel, 17 S.ILL. U. L.J. 417, fn. 8 (1993).
182. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. It is worth noting that excessive force cases can
also be articulated as deprivation of liberty interest without due process of law.
See Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485, 491 (7th Cir. 1982).
183. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
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isolated or insufficiently corroborated acts of abuse. 184
Another complication in such cases involves liability
where the defendant is not the actual assailant, but rather
another prison employee connected in some way to the
assault. As a general rule, prison workers have a duty
under § 1983 to intercede in an unlawful assault against an
inmate by a coworker, provided they know of the assault
and have a reasonable opportunity to intervene. 185 The
liability of prison workers for assaults committed against
inmates by their subordinates turns on whether such
supervisory officials are "deliberately indifferent" to a
"substantial risk" that such assaults are likely to occur and
fail to take reasonable steps to prevent them. 186 The
problem with this standard has much to do with the
meaning of deliberate indifference.
The concept of deliberate indifference was actually
elaborated on by the Supreme Court in a 1994 decision,
Farmer v. Brennan, which addressed the limits of § 1983
liability in the context of inmate-on-inmate assault.
Brennan involved a suit by a transsexual inmate in the
federal system who was raped and beaten by another
inmate after being transferred into the prison's general
population, despite the victim having previously been
segregated at another (male) prison for her own safety.
Farmer affirmed the basic principle that prison staff and
officials may be liable for exposing inmates to the risk of
violence. 187 More problematic, though, was what Farmer
actually required a plaintiff to prove in order to prevail.
Farmer held that a plaintiff must prove two elements, one
objective and the other subjective. The objective element is
relatively straightforward: that the plaintiff actually faced
a "substantial risk of serious harm."'188 More controversial is
Farmer's construction of the subjective element, which
entailed the measure of deliberate indifference on the part
of the defendant that is required to prevail in such claims.
The deliberate indifference requirement had been
184. See, e.g., Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997); Willis v.
Youngblood, 384 F.Supp. 2d 883 (D.C. Md. 2005).
185. See, e.g., Estate of Davis by Ostenfield v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388 (8th Cir.
1997).
186. See, e.g., id.; Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997).
187. Id. at 832.
188. Id. at 834.
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established by the Court almost twenty years prior, but had
not been clearly defined; in fact it had been subject to
ambiguous interpretation in other inmate-on-inmate
assault cases. 8 9 The Farmer Court made clear that
deliberate indifference contemplated that the defendant
was actually, subjectively aware of the risk that the
plaintiff faced attack and failed to take reasonable steps to
abate that risk.190
While Farmer has been decried as callous for the
Court's own indifference to the realities of prison violence
and the difficulties plaintiffs face in satisfying its
standard, 191 such a critical judgment of the case is only
partly true and partly attuned to what really makes Farmer
most problematic. Farmer not only endorsed the basic
concept of § 1983 liability in prison violence cases, it also
endorsed several more specific principles that are favorable
to plaintiffs, including: that they need not have notified
staff or administration of the harm they perceive or that it
is apt to befall them individually; that they need not wait
until they have been assaulted to establish the claim; and
that they need not prove any intention to harm them on the
defendants' part. 92 In all of these respects, Farmer was
more favorable to prisoners than it could have been. But
critics of the decision are right that the case leaves in place
189. The deliberate indifference concept was first established in Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Prior to Farmer, some federal circuits had
interpreted Estelle to require proof of actual knowledge of the risk of harm to
satisfy the deliberate indifference standard. See, e.g., Lamarca v. Turner, 995
F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1991);
Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1987). Other circuits employed a more
liberal standard. See, e.g., Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360 (3rd Cir. 1992)
(holding that "a prison official is deliberately indifferent for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment when he 'knows or should know' of the dangers facing the
inmate"); Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1983); Stewart
v. Love, 696 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1982).
190. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-42. A plaintiff may satisfy the requirements of
Farmerin two ways: (1) by demonstrating officials' deliberate indifference to a
particularized threat against the inmate; and (2) by showing that the
institution maintained inadequate security. Compare Odom v. South Carolina
Dep't of Corrs., 349 F.3d 765, 772 (4th Cir. 2003), and Horton v. Cockrell, 70
F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 1995), and Swofford v. Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1992)
with Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1992).

191. See, e.g., Will A. Smith, Civil Liability for Sexual Assault in Prison:A
Challenge to the "DeliberateIndifference" Standard, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 289
(2004).
192. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43, 848.
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significant barriers to successful prosecution of a
constitutional tort. In particular, Farmer'ssubjective test of
deliberate
indifference
gives
defendants
ample
opportunities simply to deny their awareness of the
circumstances of an inmate's assault. 193 Defendants may
avoid liability if they are able to characterize the risks that
led to the plaintiffs victimization as everyday risks
inherent to incarceration and not, in that sense, substantial
or likely to lead to serious harm. 194 They may undertake to
show that they acted reasonably in preventing or avoiding
the risk. 195 They may deny a causal connection between
their breach of duty and the injury sustained by the
inmate. 196 And they may in any case lie. The problem with
Farmer, in other words, is not that it explicitly narrows
prisoners' right to use § 1983 to remedy or deter violence
against themselves or their follow prisoners; rather, what
makes Farmerproblematic is that it formally endorses this
right while leaving prisoners with much to prove if they are
to make meaningful use of it.
The legal regime created by Farmer and the procedural
and jurisdictional impediments to § 1983 claims described
earlier create real impediments to using the statute to
address the problem of prison violence. Even if a plaintiff is
able to negotiate these, the prisoner may find it difficult to
achieve a meaningful remedy. Although § 1983
contemplates injunctive relief, the PLRA requires that
injunctive relief be narrowly tailored to address the specific
injury demonstrated by the plaintiff and that any such
injunction expire after a finite period of time. 197 Moreover,
while § 1983 also authorizes compensatory, nominal, and
punitive damages, under the PLRA, the plaintiff must
demonstrate physical injury if she or he is to recover for
198
emotional or mental injury incurred while in custody.

193. For a critique of Farmer'simplications in the context of prison assaults,
see, for example, Buchanan, supra note 171, at 83-86; James E. Robertson, A
Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme Court and Sexual Terrorism in
Prison, 81 N.C. L. REV. 433 (2003).
194. See, e.g., Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990).
195. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45.
196. See, e.g., Best v. Essex County, 986 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1993).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) & (a)(2) (2000).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(e) (2000). A similar requirement applies to Bivens
actions against federal prison staff or officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) (2000).
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Moreover, the statute imposes significant limits on attorney
fees in prisoner lawsuits, which interacts in a pernicious
fashion with the three-strikes rule on suits in forma
pauperis to limit dramatically prisoners' access to the
courts.199

These rules make it difficult for inmates to win
meaningful relief in § 1983 cases. Even before the PLRA
was enacted, the overwhelming majority of § 1983 suits
filed by inmates-by one accounting, 94%-failed entirely
to garner the inmate any remedy at all. 20 0 If anything is
awarded, it is not likely to be very significant. 201 The
plaintiff brutally beaten by guards in Hudson, for example,
had been awarded only $800 at trial. 20 2 Nor is there any
guarantee that equitable relief will actually make the
inmate any safer, or even protect him or her from
retribution by prison workers or fellow prisoners.
A prisoner has other avenues by which to seek civil
relief in a case of prison violence. The prisoner may file a
state tort claim, premised on the theory that prison officials
have a duty under statute or common law to provide for
their security and are not licensed to discipline or otherwise
manage inmates by resorting to intentionally tortious
conduct. Establishing the substantive basis for liability in
such a case is relatively clear-cut and often is not
particularly challenging, at least not in the worst cases. The
greater doctrinal difficulty for many inmates is overcoming
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which is retained in
many states. In these jurisdictions, the viability of an
inmate's suit will often turn on whether the particular duty
in question is regarded as ministerial or discretionary. If it
is deemed discretionary, the inmate can prevail only if such
discretion is grossly abused. 203 A prisoner attacked by a
fellow inmate may also sue that person for assault and the

199. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(d)(1)-(3) (2000).
200. ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS
OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 36 (1994). While

this figure refers to all § 1983 suits, regardless of the nature of the underlying
claim, the largest percentage of such suits in this study-21%--did rest on
claims of inadequate physical security. Id. at 17.
201. See id. at 36-37.
202. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
203. See, e.g., JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF INMATES § 11.1112 (Anderson 8th ed. 2006).
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like. For obvious reasons, such a strategy is, at best, a
waste of time; at worst, it could also be a dangerous
provocation.
Whether the claim is based in federal or state law, the
most significant challenge for an inmate wanting to file a
civil suit involving abusive conditions is to overcome the
practical impediments to successfully initiating and
litigating the case while imprisoned. By their very
condition, inmates have limited access to counsel and are,
in any case, almost certainly indigent and dependent either
on representing themselves or on finding an attorney who
will take the case on a contingent or reduced-fee basis. The
limitations of pro se representations are obvious in light of
the typical inmate's limited education and lack of access to
legal resources. 20 4 Even assuming that effective counsel can
somehow be secured, the plaintiff and his lawyer face
enormous hurdles in gathering competent evidence in a
prison environment. Access to both witnesses and physical
evidence relevant to the case is likely to be limited.
Witnesses, including both correctional administrators and
staff and fellow inmates, may have a sufficiently strong
interest in defeating the inmate's lawsuit that they will
withhold or distort evidence. Or they may in any case fear
retribution from colleagues should they even be seen to
support the plaintiffs claim.
Both state and federal law provide for criminal liability
in cases of prison assaults. Those who actually assault
prisoners are subject to prosecution under traditional
doctrines of assault law, whether they be prisoners
themselves or prison administrators or staff.20 5 Moreover,
under federal law, as well as that of several states, prison
workers may face special forms of criminal liability for
abusing prisoners. The criminal counterpart to §1983, 18
U.S.C. § 242, criminalizes the deprivation of constitutional

204. A comprehensive study of § 1983 suits filed by inmates, published in
1994 by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, found that almost all (96%) suits of
this kind--of which the largest share (21%) concerned claims involving physical
security-were filed pro se. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 201, at 17, 22.
Moreover, inmates may not be represented by Legal Services Corporations in
any suit concerning prison conditions. 45 C.F.R. § 1637.3 (2007).
205. This is true in the sense that there are no provisions in the criminal
codes that exempt inmate-on-inmate assaults and that prison workers must
justify their use of force against inmates and have no general license to assault
them.
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rights under color of law. This provision has been
interpreted to require that the deprivation be willful, that it
involve a right guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, and that the defendant have acted under color
of state law. 20 6 The typical provision in state law subjects
either public officials, broadly defined, or prison workers
specifically to special forms of criminal liability for
intentionally abusing people in their custody.207
Whatever the basis of criminal liability, actually
securing a successful prosecution for an assault committed
against a prisoner is quite problematic. This is true
whether the assault involves a fellow prisoner or a prison
worker. The initial problem for a prisoner who has been
victimized is, as always, negotiating the risks of retribution
that might attend reporting the case. As noted earlier,
prudence often dictates doing nothing of the kind. Even if a
prisoner does want to file a criminal complaint, she or he
must find a way to effectively communicate the complaint
to the responsible authorities. The more accessible option,
to report the crime to prison staff or administrators, is
fraught with risk of retribution and also presumes that
such persons will relay the complaint to local police or
prosecutors, who typically have jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute crimes that occur in prisons located within
their jurisdictions. Even if a complaint is relayed, or if the
prisoner manages to communicate it directly, she or he
faces another layer of problems. Local police and
prosecutors are often familiar with or are otherwise likely
to identify with prison workers, especially where the prison
is situated in a rural or small-town setting. Of course,
police and prosecutors enjoy virtually unlimited discretion
in deciding whether to investigate or prosecute a complaint.
This is true in any setting; but prisoners are especially
vulnerable to an unjust decision of this kind, as they are so
lacking in social standing and may be regarded as
deserving their fate. 208 Indeed, part of the problem is that
206. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945); United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925, 927
(8th Cir. 1956).
207. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-127 (2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2650
(West 2000). It should also be noted that some forty-four states criminalize any
sexual contact between prisoners and correctional staff, whether it is
consensual or not. See Buchanan, supra note 171, at 46.
208. Prosecutors in New York State, for example, "decline to prosecute as
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district attorneys and sheriffs are usually elected and for
that reason may be particularly sensitive to the political
consequences of investigating and prosecuting crimes in
local prisons. 20 9 Prisoners do not vote, but guards and other
prison workers do, and in some cases have translated their
collective ire at being implicated in prison assaults into real
210
trouble for district attorneys who have prosecuted them.
While these problems are especially pronounced where a
prison worker is charged with assault, they can also come
into play where administrators or staff (or the institution
itself) stand to lose credibility or incur civil liability for an
inmate-on-inmate crime. In any event-and this is true of
unelected federal authorities as well-for many reasons
police and prosecutors often downplay cases of violent crime
where the victim is a prisoner. Even if they do go forward,
they are apt to face problems securing credible witnesses
and often find it difficult to convince a jury that a crime has
occurred-or, even if they are convinced of that, that
anyone deserves to be punished for it.211
much as 75% of all [prison crime] cases referred to them" and have effectively
'decriminalized' virtually all misdemeanors." Eichenthal & Blatchford, supra

note 114, at 456.
209. Of special note in this regard is the 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision,
Leeke v. Timmerman. 454 U.S. 83 (1991). Leeke involved an attempt by
inmates, who had apparently been beaten by guards in the course of a prison
disturbance, to use § 1983 to compel the issuance of arrest warrants against the
culpable guards, where state officials had conspired to prevent those warrants
from being issued. Id. Although a federal district court and the Fourth Circuit
had allowed the claim, at least insofar as it demanded equitable and declaratory
relief, the Court rejected completely the idea that enforcement could be
compelled in this way. Id. See also Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281-81 (5th
Cir. 1990) (involving an inmate who alleged that the local sheriff did not press
criminal charges against officers who assaulted him).
210. See, e.g. ELSNER, supra note 13, at 199-200.
211. Not infrequently, prison workers are acquitted in the face of clear
evidence of criminal abuse. For example, in 1991, seven defendants were
acquitted in federal court of charges that, as guards at Florida's Charlotte
Correctional Institution, they tormented and ultimately beat to death an HIVpositive inmate named John Edwards who had been transferred to that facility
for biting another guard. The defendants were acquitted despite forensic
evidence of a savage beating and the testimony of fellow guards that the abuse
of Edwards was unjustified and retaliatory. David Green, Guards Acquitted:
Seven Officers are Cleared of Accusations They Beat and Tormented a Prison
Inmate, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 1999, at 1A. A few years later
three Florida prison guards were acquitted of charges stemming from the
deadly beating of death row inmate Frank Valdes under circumstances
suggesting that the dominant place of prisons in the local economy made a fair
hearing of the case difficult. Phil Long, Jury Acquits Three Prison Guards,
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It must be remembered, too, that none of these rights,
such as they are, are of much value in preventing a
particular case of violence. At best, they are useful in
redressing injuries already inflicted-securing damages or
altering the way an inmate is treated in prison-and
perhaps engendering changes in corrections policies and
practices that might diminish violence in the future. But
what these rights cannot do-what they manifestly have
not done-is guarantee to any inmate incarcerated today
that she or he will not inhabit a world of violence.
3. The Limits-and the Ideology--of Law in the
Context of Prison Violence. This contradictory relationship
between law and violence, by which the law condemns
violence without effectively preventing it, can be understood
in two very different ways. On the one hand, it may counsel
a certain degree of optimism about the prospects for
effective legal reform. The law at least does not condone
prison violence; and its condemnation, though practically
ineffective, can be read as a positive ideological statement
of some import. Moreover, the fact that the law has brought
about some real improvements in prison conditions in other
realms can be taken as proof of its real value as a basis of
reform in this one. By this view, which is typical among
reform-minded critics, law can, in essence, be self-correcting
in this context. The problem of prison violence, though
reflected in the inefficacy of law, can yet be remedied by a
program of more earnest and careful legal regulation.
On the other hand, that the law so stridently renounces
Feb. 16, 2002, at 1A. Jurors discounted the testimony of ten
inmates and several prison employees in acquitting the defendants. Id. Several
years later, after prosecutors dropped charges against five other inmates, the
state paid Valdes' family over $700,000 in settlement of a lawsuit over his
death. Luisa Yanez, Family of Man Killed by Guards Settles Suit, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 31, 2007. Another example comes from California. In 1993, a
group of guards at Corcoran Prison appear to have deliberately allowed an
inmate to be raped as punishment for the inmate having earlier kicked another
guard. After initial attempts at a criminal investigation of the case were
frustrated by a "code of silence" among other officers, the guards were initially
prosecuted, only to be acquitted by a jury, amidst a media campaign led by the
guards' union to generate sympathy for the defendants. See Amnesty Int'l,
California Prisons: Failure to Protect Prisoners from Abuse, AI Index AMR
51/79/00, May 24, 2000. Later, another group of guards from Corcoran were
acquitted of federal criminal charges for having set up "gladiator" fights among
inmates. GuardsAcquitted of Staging Gladiator-Style Fights, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2000, at A16. The guards were acquitted despite substantial evidence of
their guilt and the state's settlement of civil claims in the case. Id.
MIAMI HERALD,
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prison violence without restraining it in a comprehensive
and effective way can be read quite differently. From this
perspective, the law can actually be seen to abet the state's
reliance on violence as a mode of punishment. For in this
context, the state can continue to rely on violence to fulfill
the prison's punitive function without ever having to
acknowledge this reality. Indeed it can point to the law's
prohibitions of prison violence as proof that it has
repudiated violence as a tool of punishment. Worse still, by
the simple artifice of describing the law's failure to
effectively prohibit prison violence as a reflection of the
law's lingering inadequacy, the state can actually hold itself
out as the most appropriate agent to redress the problem of
violence, which it can then undertake in ways that never
actually subvert the role of violence in prison.
Nowhere are these tendencies more evident than in the
Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), which Congress
passed unanimously. The text of that statute goes on at
great length about the many harms of prison rape and the
obligation of the government to "eliminate" the
phenomenon. 212 Yet the statute itself does nothing to
advance this agenda; its practical effects are confined to
stressing the need for education and training, facilitating
the gathering of data on the subject, encouraging the
rewriting of formal standards for dealing with prison rape,
and providing various grants to government entities that
213
run the prisons and jails in which these outrages occur.
More than a simple failure, PREA can be seen as an
instrument by which the state has, by omission, actually
authorized the continued role of violence in defining the
prison experience and its punitive function, while
distancing itself from this very thing.
Critics of prison violence who put their faith in the
prospect of legal reform risk participating in this deceptive,
disingenuous project. 214 Of course, the call for more effective
redress of prison violence is not in itself problematic; it

212. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15602 (2007).
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 15601- 9 (2007).
214. See, e.g. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS FOR ALL, supra note 135 at
80-86; Jerita L. DeBraux, Prison Rape: Have We Done Enough? A Deep Look at
the Adequacy of the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 50 How. L.J. 203 (2006);
Robertson, supra note 194 at 473-80; Donald Specter, Making Prisons Safe:
Strategiesfor Reducing Violence, 22 WASH. U. J. L & POL'Y 125 (2006).
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actually exudes a level of concern for the security and the
humanity of prisoners that is not exactly commonplace in
our culture. What is problematic about such a demand,
though, is the notion inherent in it that violence is somehow
dysfunctional and deviant vis-A-vis the true and legitimate
logic of punishment-that such violence is alien to the
prison's identity as prison. As I argue more thoroughly
below, violence does not negate the prison or corrupt the
state's prerogative to punishment; it actually fulfills the
prison's fundamental social function; it is not alien to the
prison, but rather integral to its meaning in contemporary
society. Those who fail to grasp this point blind themselves
to the futility of their efforts and condemn themselves to a
campaign for legal reforms that will never actually root out
prison violence. And in so doing, they also unwittingly
assist the state in denying just how much its dominant
system of punishment-and, ultimately, the social structure
that the state itself supports-actually relies on the very
violence that the law purports to prohibit.
D. Material Conditions of Life in the ContemporaryPrison
One area in which efforts at reform and the rise of a
culture of professionalism in prison administration have
had an unquestionably positive effect is in improving the
material conditions of life experienced by the vast majority
of prison inmates. To be clear: as a rule, prisons hardly offer
the
luxurious,
"country-club"-type
accommodations
sometimes attributed to them in reactionary commentary.
Instead, the typical prison (particularly if of high or
medium security classification) is relentlessly austere,
usually exceptionally noisy, and often bathed in foul odors.
Prison food is usually not very palatable and sometimes of
questionable quality or healthfulness. The quality of
medical and dental care is often somewhat questionable,
too. As mentioned earlier, overcrowding has emerged in the
last few decades as a chronic problem, reducing many
facilities designed for single-cell occupancy to double- and
even triple-bunking of inmates. And inmates are subject to
the "pains" inherent in the fact of incarceration: isolation
from family and friends, loss of liberty, regimentation, and
so forth.
And yet, for all these important qualifications, prisons
have improved dramatically on almost every one of these
fronts over the last several decades-and done so as a direct
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consequence of reformist activism and the rise of
administrative
professionalism. 215
With
occasional
exceptions, prisoners are afforded, at little or no cost to
themselves, the basic necessities of life: a reasonably
healthy diet, fairly clean and sanitary accommodations, and
even functional attire. And although health care for
inmates is subject to valid criticism (not to mention being
the butt of many jokes) for being substandard, 216 it is
surprisingly competent, as reflected in the fact that prison
inmates actually have a lower mortality rate than members
of their age group from the population at large. 217
Moreover, despite recent efforts in the name of fiscal
discipline and less eligibility to curtail such programs,
many inmates can even avail themselves, again at little or
no cost, of secondary and sometimes higher education, as
well as employment skills training. According to the Bureau
of Justice statistics, as of 2000, about 84% of state prisons
offered secondary education to inmates; about 56% offered
vocational training; and over one-quarter offered college
courses. 218 More than half of inmates reported taking
advantage of these, with about 23% advancing their
secondary education, 32% taking up vocational training,
and 10% studying at the college level. 219 Occasionally,
prisoners may even be presented with opportunities for

215. On the importance of litigation to this trend, see, for example, Susan P.
Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639
(1993).

216. See, e.g. Dean A. Dabney & Michael S. Vaughn, Incompetent Jail and

Prison Doctors, 80 PRISON J. 151, 153-54 (2000); Michael S. Vaughn & Leo
Carroll, Separate and Unequal: Prison Versus Free-World Medical Care, 15
JUST. Q. 3, 4-6 (1998).
217. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL CAUSES
OF DEATH IN STATE PRISONS, 2001-2004 at 3 (2007). See also Ingrid A.
Brinswanger, et al., Release from Prison-A High Risk of Death for Former
Inmates, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 157, 161 (2007). This is despite the fact that
prisons are so violent and that many inmates arrive at prison already suffering
significant health problems. See MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF INMATES, supra note
117.
218. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EDUCATION AND
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 4 tbl.3 (2003) [hereinafter EDUCATION AND
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS]. Federal prisons offered these programs at
significantly higher rates: 98.7% offered secondary education; 80.5% offered
college courses; and 93.5% offered vocational training. Id.
219. Id. at 4 tbl.4. Notably, only access to college education programs seems
to have been diminished in recent years. Id. at tbl.3.
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artistic or cultural indulgences. Notably, the people who
find themselves in prison have no general right to any of
these things in the free world. And as we shall see later, in
Part III, the social conditions of life in the social strata from
which most prisoners hail are in fact so deprived and
insecure with regard to precisely these basic aspects of
existence as to compare unfavorably with life inside prison.
It is precisely as a consequence that violence shows its
relevance to the meaning of prison in contemporary society.
II. LESS ELIGIBILITY, SOCIAL STRUCTURE,
AND PRISON VIOLENCE

This Article's central claim is that violence is essential
to the prison's social function in contemporary society.
Such an understanding of prison violence is dependent,
analytically, on a critical concept of less eligibility. The first
section of this Part identifies such a concept in the work of
its most effective exponent, Georg Rusche. Integral to such
a concept is a dynamic, interactive view of the relationship
between prison conditions and political economy, one
centered on the fundamental idea that the social meaning
of punishment is relative to the life conditions of the lower
class. Accordingly, the second section of this Part
emphasizes several themes: the nature of imprisonment as
a mode of controlling the poor and as an experience largely
reserved to the poor; the remarkable degree to which the
social circumstances of the lower class have either
stagnated or deteriorated over the last several decades; and
the basis of these developments in class and social structure
in changes in political economy and class politics. In a
similar vein, the final section of this Part undertakes to
show how, via the concept of less eligibility, this
deterioration in the conditions of lower class life and the
larger changes in political economy and social structure
that attend it actually explain the role of violence in the
contemporary prison, rejecting the view that such violence
is deviant or anomalous in favor of an interpretation that
sees it as fundamental to the nature of crime and
punishment in an unequal society.
A. Georg Rusche and the Development of a Critical Concept
of Less Eligibility
As conceived by Bentham, the concept of less eligibility
was more a normative aspiration, steeped in liberal
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assumptions about the possibilities of humane punishment,
than it was a device for unmasking the actual nature of
punishment in modern society. 220 Thus Bentham's classic
formulation of the concept exudes not only a distinctly
prescriptive tone, but also the rather bald suggestion that
the logic of less eligibility simply should not extend to
matters of violence. 221 He writes, "Saving the regard due to
life, health, and bodily ease, the ordinary condition of a
convict doomed to a punishment which few or none but the
individuals of the poorest class are apt to incur, ought not
to be made more eligible than that of the poorest class of
' 222
subjects in a state of innocence and liberty.
Bentham's notion reflects a general tendency among
Enlightenment thinkers, not only to discount abusive
violence as a factor of less eligibility, but also to rely on the
concept primarily to identify the preferred type of
punishment that should be imposed on those convicted of
crimes. 223 In this capacity, the concept actually takes on a
largely reactionary cast, as it informs an essentially
normative quest to preserve the functionality of criminal
punishment, particularly the newly-emergent prison, as a
means of deterring crime, and to secure the prison's
punitive function and reputation against more ambitious
calls for reforms. 224 It would be left to Georg Rusche in the
early Twentieth Century to invert this tendency and use
less eligibility to expose within the dynamics of criminal
punishment the politics of class domination and social
control-including, potentially, the way these dynamics
might inhere in the abusive realties of modern
punishment. 225
220. See generally, Bentham, supra note 6.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 122-23.
223. See generally, Edward W. Sieh, Less Eligibility: The Upper Limits of
PenalPolicy, 3 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 159, 159 (1989).

224. On this reactionary aspect of the history of less eligibility, see, for
example, DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL
STRATEGIES 11-15 (1985); GEORGE RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 105-07 (2003). See also HERMANN MANNHEIM, THE
DILEMMA OF PENAL REFORM (1939).

225. The concept of less eligibility appears only infrequently in
contemporary critiques of prison conditions. An example includes Dean A.
Dabney & Michael S. Vaughn, Incompetent Jail and Prison Doctors, 80 PRISON
J. 151 (2000). See also Edward W. Sieh, supranote 224.
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Although Rusche is an important figure in the critical
discourse on punishment, surprisingly little is known about
his personal life and even his intellectual development.
What is known about the man is owed largely to the
inquiries of criminologist Dario Melossi. Melossi's
biographical sketch of Rusche describes a singularly
enigmatic figure, difficult to deal with, secretive, and
without any lasting family connections or enduring
friendships. 226 Born in Germany in 1900, Rusche completed
doctorates in philosophy and social science in the mid
1920s. 22 7 By the early part of the next decade, he had
embarked on a study of the political economy of punishment
that brought to bear a broadly Marxist perspective, attuned
to the dynamics of class conflict and to the importance of
economic structures in the development of social
institutions and cultural norms. 228 Rusche would never
actually complete this project, however. Over the next
decade or so, his work was continually interrupted by exile
and by his own often chaotic (and sometimes quite
questionable) personal affairs. 229 By 1950, Rusche had
taken his own life. 23 0 Besides a few articles, his intellectual
legacy consisted of only one major piece, the book
Punishment and Social Structure, which had been
published in 1939.
Widely regarded as a seminal contribution to the study
of punishment, Punishment and Social Structure was
sponsored by the so-called Frankfurt School-the eclectic
assortment of neo-Marxist philosophers and social thinkers
whose exile from Nazi-dominated Europe seeded American
culture with heterodox, sometimes radical insights on
231
philosophy, cultural criticism, and social theory.
Unfortunately for Rusche, the Frankfurt School's assistance
came at a price: the unwelcome participation of Otto

226. Melossi, Introduction, in RUsCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225 at xxxi; see also, Dario Melossi, "George Rusche: A BiographicalEssay," 14 CRIME &
SOC. JUST. 51 (1980).

227. Melossi, Introduction, in RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225 at x.;
Melossi, supra note 227.
228. DAVID GARLAND, supranote 225, at 89.

229. Melossi, Introduction, in RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 227 at xxxi.
230. Id. at xxi.
231. Id. at xviii-xix.
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Kirschheimer, one of their ranks (and an important figure
in the critical discourse on politics and jurisprudence 232), as
co-author of the project. Although Punishment and Social
Structure bears both men's names, the book's most
important
insights,
however,
are
overwhelmingly
Rusche's. 233
Rusche was, without question, a gifted social critic who
used his grounding in Marxist analysis to remarkable
effect. His recasting of less eligibility drew on a broader
project of his to understand punishment, not abstractly or
juridically, as was (and still is) the dominant tendency, but
historically, in its interrelationship to social structure and
class. 234 It was from this standpoint that Rusche developed
a provocative hypothesis about the relationship between
labor and punishment for which he, along with
Kirchheimer, is probably most often remembered today. As
usually articulated, this hypothesis centers on the notion
that the relative scarcity or abundance of labor at a given
historical moment within a society directly affects the
intensity with which punishment is imposed. 235 This idea,
in turn, is typically expressed even more narrowly as the
claim that changes in rates of unemployment are directly
reflected as changes in incarceration rates. 236 The resulting
"labor supply" theory has been the subject of a number of
empirical studies, some dismissive, but at least as many
purporting to confirm its essential claim. 237
232. On Kirchheimer's intellectual life, see WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN,
BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE
OF LAw 3-6 (1994).
233. On Rusche's life, see RusCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225 at x;
Dario Melossi, Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer: Punishment and Social
Structure, 9 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 73, 73 (1978). Apparently, Rusche authored the
majority of Punishment and Social Structure-chapters II through VIII, of a
total of XIII. See id. at xviii.
234. See RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225 at 5-6; George Rusche,
Labor Market and Penal Sanction: Thoughts on the Sociology of Criminal
Justice, 10 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 2, 2-3 (Gerda Dinwiddie trans.) (1978)
[hereinafter Labor Market and Penal Sanction].
235. Melossi, Introduction, in RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225 at
xxiii.

236. For a review of this thesis, see DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND
MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 89-110 (1990).
237. See, e.g., Theodore G. Chiricos & Miriam A. Delone, Labor Surplus and

Punishment:A Review and Assessment of Theory and Evidence, 39 SOC. PROBS.
421 (1992).
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As intriguing and provocative as this labor supply
thesis is, it actually represents only a small part of broader,
more nuanced thesis that Rusche developed on the political
economy of punishment. As Melossi argues, Rusche's
scholarly inquiries constitute an overarching effort to
understand the role that criminal punishment plays as an
institution of class domination and control.238 For Rusche,
the essential function of punishment in society has
consistently entailed a project of disciplining the lower
classes, maintaining their participation in labor markets or
other institutions of production, and ensuring their
acquiescence to prevailing institutions of property, social
hierarchy, and authority. 239 This view of Rusche, which
seems quite well-grounded in a careful re-reading of his
work, not only re-situates the labor supply hypothesis as a
small part of a much broader theoretical campaign to
unmask the connection between punishment and labor; it
also preserves a better sense of the central thrust of
Rusche's work, from which, importantly, his critical
thoughts on less eligibility emerge. 240 A brief review of his
thesis makes this point clear.
For Rusche, the connection between labor and
punishment manifests itself in several interlocking ways.
On perhaps the most obvious level is a close correspondence
between the dominant modes of labor in society and the
dominant forms of punishment in that society. 241 For
example, in slave economies, enslavement has tended to
constitute the dominant mode of punishment; similarly,
manufactory capitalism has tended to imprint its structures
and norms in the architecture of the modern
penitentiary. 242 Closely related to this homology of form is

238. See Melossi, Introduction, in RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225.
239. See generally RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225. See also Labor

Market and Penal Sanction, supra note 235, at 3.
240. See RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225, at xxiii-xxviii.
241. Id. at 53-58, 62-71, 128-31; Labor Market and Penal Sanction, supra
note 235, at 4-8.
242. See, e.g., RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225, at 53-58, 62-71, 12831. See also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750-1850, AT 174-206 (1978); DARIO MELOSSI &
MASSIMO PAVARINI, THE PRISON AND THE FACTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM (Glynis Cousin trans., 1981). On this dynamic as it reflected itself in the

development of Nineteenth and Twentieth century prisons in the South around
the plantation model, see, for example, DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN
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another, more active level of interaction between labor and
punishment involving the role that punishment has
consistently played in disciplining, motivating, or otherwise
regulating labor. In Rusche's view, the dominant
punishments of the last millennium variously betray means
of coercing people to work when circumstances otherwise
discourage labor market participation, of dealing with
surplus people in times of labor surplus, and of encouraging
compliance with the structures and norms of the prevailing
political and economic order. Thus, he argued, changes in
the character of punishment in society tend to reflect
relatively shorter-term, cyclical changes in the condition of
labor in society. In times of labor scarcity, punishment
tends to serve as a means of disciplining and motivating
workers, even on occasion playing a direct role in putting
them to work; and it develops around forms, methods, and
rationalizing ideologies essential to this function. In times
of labor surplus, punishment is reoriented to preempting
social disorder, warehousing the socially redundant,
punishing threats to property or other expressions of
disorder by cruel means, and so forth; and it changes its
243
structure and ideology to accommodate this mode as well.
According to Rusche, too, the tendency of punishment to
relate to labor in such variable ways reflects itself, in part,
in regular changes in the extent of punishment in societythat is, the intensity and degree to which punishments
already in existence are actually used. 244 The labor supply
thesis just mentioned follows from this particular aspect of
Rusche's work.
Hidden from those who confine their attentions to these
aspects of Rusche's scholarship is another, equally
provocative proposition: that in articulating its function as
an institution of labor control, and in sustaining this
function amidst evolving social conditions, punishment
undergoes regular, often cyclical changes, not merely in its
overall form or intensity of use, but in the degree to which
its operative punitive aspect is stressed in actual
application. In other words, another key idea of Rusche's is
that punishment is generally harsher under conditions of
labor surplus than labor scarcity, in part because more

SLAVERY:" PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996).

243. See generally, RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supranote 225 at chs. II-VII.
244. Labor Market and Penal Sanction, supra note 235, at 3-8.
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severe means are required to motivate labor; in part
because the anger, alienation, and desperation of the poor
inspire more affronts to property and authority and other
deviant tendencies; and in part because the diminished
social value of labor under such conditions reduces
impediments to labor's harsh treatment. Likewise,
punishment tends to be less harsh under conditions of labor
scarcity because less is then required to motivate and
discipline workers, and because the relatively higher social
value of labor under such conditions militates against harsh
treatment. 245 It is in this context that the question of less
eligibility becomes central to Rusche's critique 246and that
Rusche recasts the concept in more critical terms.
The essential importance of less eligibility to Rusche's
argument is clear: if punishment is to serve as an effective
institution of class control it must feature a genuinely
punitive character-no less so than if its aim were simply
moral retribution or the control of crime in the interests of
public safety. This notion encompasses a very basic and
commonplace view of less eligibility: that the prison cannot
be so attractive to the poor that it offers an attractive
alternative to the life in the free world; otherwise, the
argument goes, the poor would seek out punishment.
Rusche embraces this view of less eligibility; in his words
incarceration must be sufficiently less eligible to deter
"persons who might use the gaol as a place of ultimate
refuge" from the hardships of the free world. 247
Nevertheless, this very basic view of less eligibility
represents its weakest formulation. It is apparently this
definition that renown criminologist Norval Morris has in
mind when he dismisses the concept as unrealistic in
contemporary times, declaring that only a thoroughly
"institutionalized" person would trade the free world for
prison, no matter their respective material offerings. 248
Perhaps this is so; although, as we shall see in the next
section, the relevant trade-offs may not be as Morris'
critique presumes.
In any case, what really distinguishes Rusche's
245. See RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225 at chs. II-IV.
246. Labor Market and Penal Sanction,supra note 235, at 3-4.
247. See RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225, at 113 (citations omitted).
248. See Norval Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REV.
627, 636 (1966).
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conception of less eligibility, and what lends it such a
critical quality, is how it transcends this basic formation. In
particular, Rusche appreciated the important role that
criminality plays in giving a more textured meaning to the
less eligibility problem. Crime, after all, mediates the
relationship between punishment and its social functions in
the sense that only those who are either actually or
potentially subject to criminal liability may be controlled by
criminal punishment. For Rusche, this requirement in no
way compromises the ability of criminal punishment to
serve as an institution of class control, since criminality
itself is so thoroughly and conveniently concentrated among
the lower classes. 249 But what criminality does do is add a
complicating dimension to the less eligibility problem.
Although the concentration of criminality among the poor
should not be taken simply as proof of the lower classes'
greater moral degeneracy or dangerousness, it does reflect
the proliferation among the poor of factors, quite
independent of the possible attractions of incarceration,
that underlie the commission of crimes. As Rusche
appreciated, and as we will discuss in the next section, such
tendencies can be understood in terms of both rational and
irrational responses to deprivation and social inequality. 250
In any case, the fact that the poor are already
disproportionately inclined to criminality means that the
less eligibility problem must entail not simply a
circumstance where prison is so attractive that the poor
elect it as a means of support-the circumstance that
Morris and others might find so improbable-but also one
in which the relative loss of punitive effect of criminal
sanction excessively elevates the attraction of crime as a
response to poverty, thus entirely defeating any use of
criminal sanction as a means of social control. 251
Understood in this way, less eligibility can fail far more
easily than Morris and other critics might imagine.
Other critical advantages of Rusche's account of less
eligibility flow from the way he integrates less eligibility
into a broader critique of the political economy of

249. See Labor Market and Penal Sanction, supranote 235, at 3.
250. See id.
251. In Rusche's words, "If penal sanctions are supposed to deter these
strata from crime in an effective manner, they must appear even worse than the
strata's present living conditions." Id.
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punishment. For Rusche, the practical implications of less
eligibility-the determinations of just what is less eligible
in a particular situation-are as historically contingent as
the overall nature and function of punishment; indeed, the
tendency of a system of punishment to maintain its lesser
eligibility inevitably
influenced the magnitude of
punishment (for example, the length of average prison
terms) as well as its kind-whether, for example, a
particular sentence might involve incarceration versus, say,
corporeal punishment. 252 In this fashion, Rusche saw that
the meaning of what is less eligible would necessarily vary
with the changing functions of punishment at any
particular time as well as with the changing reality of what,
in a relative sense, constitutes punishment at a particular
point in history. 253 Similarly, for Rusche, the logic of less
eligibility augments and reflects the general tendency of
dominant modes of production and established labor
techniques to influence the nature of punishment in
society. 254
Of course, some punishments, like death by torture, are
less eligible than just about anything. In practice, the less
eligibility concept is most relevant to relatively milder
sanctions, like transportation and especially incarceration,
which can either be modulated for greater or lesser punition
or traded off against each other to the same end. In a
modern context, less eligibility is primarily concerned with
the prison. To a degree, the logic of less eligibility can be
implemented through changes
in the length of
incarceration, such that the very length of a sentence
(combined with its definitiveness) is sufficiently daunting to
eliminate any indifference about the costs of criminality.
But less eligibility in the context of incarceration can go
well beyond this to include within its harsh metric a
concern for maintaining the harshness of the prison
experience itself. It is with this in mind that Rusche speaks
of the "cruel penalties" needed to sustain less eligibility. 255
And while Rusche does not expressly include illegal violence
in this vein, the relentlessness with which he emphasizes
the realities of punishment over its formal and legal
252. See Labor Market and Penal Sanction, supra note 235, at.3-8.
253. See generally Labor Market and Penal Sanction, supranote 235,
254. See id. at 6-7.
255. See id. at 4.

802

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

pretenses leaves no doubt on how this issue fits in this
theory.
Rusche was aware that historical contingency in the
meaning of less eligibility varied as well with the social
conditions of those subject to its logic. 256 As the
circumstances of the working class change for better or for
worse, so does the punitive value of any particular
punishment scheme. While a general deterioration in the
social conditions for this class effectively reduces the
punitive effect of punishment, a general improvement has
the opposite effect of increasing effective punition. Rusche
was in fact very explicit in anticipating how long and short
cycles of economic crisis and prosperity, as well as the rise
of the welfare state and other developments that might
generally improve the lot of the lower classes, would all
indirectly
influence
the
relative
harshness
of
punishment. 257
B. Punishment, PoliticalEconomy, and the Degradationof
Lower Class Life
Our society is home to many people who stand to be
tempted in such fashion. According to the most recent data
from the Census Bureau, in 2005, 37 million Americans, or
about 12.6 percent of the population, lived in poverty as
officially defined by the federal government. 258 More
troubling, 16 million existed in a condition of "deep" or
"'severe" poverty: subsisting on less than $5,080 per year
per individual, or $9,903 per year for a family of four. 259 The
same data reveal a massive 49.3 million people subsisting
at or below an income of only 125 percent of the poverty
256. See generally, RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 225; Labor Market
and Penal Sanction, supranote 235.
257. Id. at 6-7.
258. In 2005, 36,950 Americans lived in poverty, which the Census Bureau
defined in 2005 as an annual income of $10,160 for an individual under 65
years of age and $19,806 per year for a family of two adults and two children.
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 13 (2006)
[hereinafter INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE]. It should be noted that
the official poverty measure has been the subject of considerable criticism for
relying on an outdated methodology that likely understates the poverty rate.
LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA: 2006/2007, at 282
(2007).
259. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 259, at 6.
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line, which works out to an annual income for a single
adult
260
of less than $15,240, or $29,709 for a family of four. Still
more troubling is a recent analysis of data from the
Internal Revenue Service (which accounts income
somewhat differently than the Census Bureau) by the New
York Times. The Times report paints a bleak picture of
concentrated destitution: notably, that some 60 million
Americans live on less than seven dollars per day. 26 1 A
similar reality is evident in terms of accumulated wealth.
According to the Economic Policy Institute, as of 2004, 17%
of households had either a net worth of zero or less than
zero; 29.6 percent had a net worth of less than $10,000; and
the average net worth of the poorest 40 percent of
households was only $2,200.262 Needless to say, these
dismal reflections of poverty stand alongside an obscene
concentration of privilege at the other end of the spectra of
income 263
and wealth-an issue to which we will return
shortly.
Consistent with the implications of less eligibility and
the broader critique of punishment as class control in which
it participates, it is overwhelmingly from such lower social
strata that the criminal justice system draws its victims.
This is of course an obvious fact, no less today than in
Rusche's time. Still, some basic statistics underscore the
point. According to a recent report by the Department of
Justice drawing on data from the mid-1990s, less than onehalf of jail inmates were employed full-time before their
arrest; twenty-two percent received government assistance
(a very high number for a mostly adult male population);
and only about one-third earned more than $12,000 per
year before they were arrested. 264 Likewise, few defendants

260. See id. at 17, 45.
261. David Cay Johnston, '04 Income in U.S. Was Below 2000 Level, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at C1, C7.

262. Id. at 263 tbl.5.9; MISHEL ET AL., supranote 259, at 257 tbl.5.5.
263. For example, as of 2004, the top one percent of wealthiest households
held assets worth an average of $14,770,400. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 259, at
263 tbl.5.9. Cumulatively, such people held one-third of all household wealth in
the country. Id. at 253-54 tbl.5.3. Similarly, the richest one-fifth of the
population accounted for 84.7 percent of household wealth. Id. In that same
year, the top 0.1 percent of the population, which includes about 300,000
Americans, reported greater combined pre-tax income than the poorest 120
million Americans. Johnston, supra note 262.
264. CAROLINE WOLF HARLAN, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES
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possess any real assets whatsoever. 265 The vast majorityabout eighty percent--cannot afford the services of a
lawyer. 266 Naturally, such is the class background of prison
inmates as well. While direct measures of class among this
population are usually mooted by their circumstances,
indirect measures suffice to make the point. For example,
according to official data from 1997, about three-quarters of
state prisoners did not finish high school; and of these, over
thirty-nine percent identified going to work, into the
military, or "financial problems" as the reason they left
267
school.
Such figures imply a fact essential to Rusche's concept
of less eligibility: that poverty and social marginality tend
to beget criminality. This is indeed true, albeit for reasons
that (again, consistent with Rusche's critique) transcend
any simple inferences about the correlation of class
background with moral depravity or dangerousness. The
strong relationship between poverty and criminality can be
understood as a product of the concentration of
criminogenic forces in lower class life. By this view, a
combination of stresses, frustrated ambitions, fractured
family structures, and other life conditions uniquely
concentrated in lower class life produce greater levels 268
of
alienation, "deviance," and ultimately criminal behavior.
Of particular relevance to the current topic is a thesis,
strongly associated with Steven Messner and Richard
1996 3-4 (1998).
265. Andrew Karmen, Poverty, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in FROM
SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF

CRIMINAL LAW 25, 27 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000).

266.

CAROLINE WOLF HARLAN, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

DEFENSE COUNSEL IN

6 (2000).
267. EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, supra note 219, at 3.

CRIMINAL CASES 1,

268. This perspective has traditionally consisted of several related theories.
For some scholars, social inequality creates "ecological" conditions that generate
crime. See, e.g., CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND URBAN AREAS at ix-xiii (1942). For others, the disjuncture of means and
ends for the poor in stratified societies generates criminality. See generally
RICHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY:

A

THEORY OF DELINQUENT GANGS (1960). For still others, the tendency for
capitalism to generate high levels of "egoism" engenders criminality among the
lower classes. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. BONGER, CRIMINALITY AND ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS 401-07 (1916). For a review of these and more contemporary
theories on this topic, see Theodore G. Chiricos, Rates of Crime and
Unemployment: An Analysis of Aggregate Research Evidence, 34 SOC. PROBS.

187 (1987).
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Rosenfeld, that attributes much of the criminality in
American society (including high rates of violent crime) to a
desire by poor, exploited, and socially marginalized people
to realize conventional measures of social comfort and
of the "American
success, and to the way this pursuit
269
Dream" ultimately generates crime.
Indeed, it is possible, in a yet more direct way, to see in
the criminality of the lower classes more or less rational
responses to poverty and the limited opportunities of lower
class life. This point is underscored in several important
ethnographies that emphasize the important role of crime
as a mode of material support in lower class life. 270 It is also
revealed, in a rather more stark way, in the statistical
dynamics of criminality itself. A large majority of felony
convictions in state courts are for property and drug
crimes. 271 Likewise, about forty-one percent of all state
inmates are serving time for property crimes or drug
offenses, along with another fourteen percent incarcerated
for robbery. 272 The same observations about the
relationship between crime and lower class life invite a still
more critical reflection on the class politics that inhere in
the way the criminal law is defined. Such an exercise
might, for example, involve asking just why it is that
certain behaviors are criminalized and others not? To the
same end, one can ask why breaches of the law by the poor
or punished than those
are more aggressively prosecuted
273
common to the more affluent.
269. STEVEN F. MESSNER & RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN

DREAM at ix-1 (4th ed. 2007).
270. See Jeffrey Fagen, Gangs, Drugs, and Neighborhood Change, in GANGS
IN AMERICA 39 (Ronald C. Huff ed., 2nd ed. 1996); JOHN HAGEDORN WITH PERY
MACON, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A RUSTBELT
CITY 101-05, 118-27 (1988); JAY MACLEOD, AIN'T No MAKIN' IT: LEVELED
ASPIRATIONS IN A LOW-INCOME NEIGHBORHOOD 31-33 (1987); JOAN W. MOORE,
GOING DOWN TO THE BARRIO: HOMEBOYS AND HOMEGIRLS IN CHANGE (1991); Betty
Lou VALENTINE, HUSTLING AND OTHER HARD WORK (1978). See generally SUDHIR
ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE URBAN
POOR (2006).
271. See, e.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT
FELONS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 2 tbl.1 (2006) (describing felony convictions

in state courts in the 75 largest counties, by most serious charge, 1990-2002).
272. PAIGE M HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

PRISONERS IN 2005 at 9-10 tbls.13 & 14 (2006).
273. For a reflection on these questions, see generally JEFFREY REIMAN, THE
RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON (8th ed. 2006).
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What is clear, in any case, is that in practice criminality
is uniquely prevalent among the poor. As Rusche
understood, such a strong relationship between class and
crime is essential to the criminal justice system functioning
as a system of class control, as it is the very thing that
allows punishment to be brought to bear as a means of
control. Critically, for the present argument, this
relationship also directly implicates the logic of less
eligibility. In order for incarceration truly to function as
punishment-let alone class control-it is not enough that
it be punitive in the abstract or even in some democratic
sense; the prison must be punitive for the poor and it can
only be punitive in relation to the social conditions of the
poor. Such is the medium by which the concept of less
eligibility draws out a connection between prison violence,
on the one hand, and poverty and inequality, on the other.
C. Less Eligibility and the Meaning of Prison Violence in
Social Context
Where crime exists as both a reaction to poverty and a
means of economic support, and where poverty is so
pervasive, the prison is at great risk of losing its punitive
effect and becoming, if not a haven for the poor, then a
sanction with little meaning to those it is intended to
punish and to deter. Indeed, this risk of a loss of less
eligibility has been heightened over the past several
decades, as the social conditions of the poor have in some
ways actually deteriorated over this period, while the
material conditions of confinement (sans violence) have
actually improved. This dynamic exposes the historical
character of the less eligibility problem as well as its
grounding in political economy, particularly where
connected to changes in the role and nature of violence in
prison.
1. The Political Economy of Poverty and Inequality.
The deteriorated social conditions of the poor are evident in
both absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, for
example, the official poverty rate, which fell dramatically
and steadily from the late 1950s until about 1970, has
remained almost unchanged since then; and, given changes
in population, vastly more people subsist below the poverty
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line today than in the 1970s. 274 Worse, the "poverty gap"the average amount by which the income of the poor falls
beneath the poverty rate-has increased significantly since
the mid 1970s. 27 5 Similarly, the percentage of people in
deep poverty is at the highest level since 1975.276 These
trends in poverty rates are consistent with trends in wages
and overall income, which have remained stagnant over the
last three decades, despite steady increases in worker
productivity. 277 This problem is greatest among low-wage
workers, with average wages in the lowest tenth percentile
actually 2.3 percent less in 2005 than in 1979.278 Likewise,
the percentage of American households with zero or
negative net worth was greater in 2004 than it was in 1983;
the percentage of households with a net worth of less than
$10,000 has remained virtually unchanged over that
period. 279 And the net worth of the bottom forty percent of
American households, which averaged $5,400 in 1983, now
averages only $2,200.280 These downward trends in income
and wealth accompanied a dramatic increase in the spatial
concentration of poverty in blighted, usually urban,
1
neighborhoods. 28
Social class is nothing if not a relative concept. An even
more startling and disturbing picture of the deterioration of
lower class life is evident when such measures are
contrasted to the economic conditions of the upper classes.
The picture that emerges is one of rapidly growing
inequality. The Times' analysis of IRS data found that
between 1979 and 2004, the average income of taxpayers
"on the ninety-fifth to ninety-ninth rung of the income
ladder rose by fifty-three percent;" that one-third of all
increases in national income during that period went to the
top one percent of income earners; and that half of that
274. INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH COVERAGE, supra note 259, at 13, fig. 4.

275. MISHEL ET AL., supranote 259, at 288-90, fig. 6C.
276. Tony Pugh, U.S. Economy Leaving Record Numbers in Severe Poverty,
MCCLATCHY

NEWPAPERS,

Feb.

22,

2007,

http://www.mcclatchydc.comstaffltony-pugh/story/15657.html.
277. MISHEL ETAL., supra note 259, at 112-14.
278. Id. at 120-22 tbl.3.4.
279. Id. at 257 tbl.5.5.
280. Id. at 263 tbl.5.9.
281. See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND
THE AMERICAN CITY 29-58 (1996).
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went to the top one-tenth of these people, whose average
incomes more than tripled over that period. 282 This trend
represents the reversal of a significant leveling of income
inequality in the post-War/post-Depression era. 283 While
the average wealth of the bottom forty percent of the
population declined between 1983 and 2004, that of the top
one percent has increased some seventy-seven percent over
the same period. 284 Moreover, the poor have been left
behind, not just by the obscenely wealthy, but also by the
middle-class. While the middle-class has also lost economic
ground to the truly wealthy (measured, for example, by
changes in income and share of national wealth), its modest
gains in total wealth and in income have distanced its
members from the truly poor. 28 5 The resulting exacerbation
of relative poverty for the poor is significant not merely as a
measure of overall social marginalization, but also as an
index of how much the criminogenic pressures of povertyrelative deprivation, alienation, and the like-have
increased over the past several decades.
Such changes in wealth and income are more than
accidents or the results of isolated developments in policy or
economic structure. Rather, they reflect wide-spread and
deep-seated changes in political economy, centered in a
number of key developments in both politics and social
structure. Some of these changes may be grouped under the
heading of "deindustrialization," in particular the decline of
employment in the traditionally high-wage manufacturing
sector, 286 the shift of remaining plant to low-wage markets,
and the demise of organized labor. 28 7 These developments,

282. Johnston, supra note 262, at Cl; see also Thomas Piketty & Emanuel
Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 1
(2003); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: A BRIEF LOOK AT
POSTWAR U.S. INCOME INEQUALITY 1 (1996).

283. See Piketty, supra note 283, at 11, fig. I.
284. The overall increase in average wealth for this group has been from
$8,315,200 to $14,770,400. MISHEL ET AL., supranote 259, at 263 tbl.5.9.
285. See, e.g., id. at 121-25, 263.
286. See

generally

BEYOND

THE

RUINS:

THE

MEANINGS

OF

DEINDUSTRIALIZATION (Jefferson Cowie & Joseph Heathcott eds. 2003). On the
effect of this shift on wages, see MISHEL ET AL., supra note 259, at 168-71.
287. By official measure, as of 2006, only 12.0 percent-of wage and salary
workers in the U.S. were union members, down from 12.5 percent the previous
year, and down from 20.1 percent a recently as 1983. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Union Members in 2006, at 1 (Jan. 25,
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which have significantly reduced economic opportunities for
working-class people, were already underway as early as
the 1950s and 1960s;288 but they accelerated from the 1970s
onward. 28 9 And while the effects of deindustrialization on
working class people were muted in 1960s and 1970s by
increasingly generous welfare policies, 290 the period since
the mid 1970s-especially the 1980s and 1990s-has been
291
marked by a dramatic retrenchment of the welfare state.
This phenomenon has its origins in the rise in the 1970s of
a more or less chronic fiscal crisis, rooted in what some
scholars have identified as the inherent inability of the
modern, capitalist state to fund the welfare state while
sustaining its political legitimacy among elites. 292 However,
the retrenchment of the welfare state has also drawn on an
ideological element, one that has not only questioned the
overall social value of the welfare state and endorsed
various regressive changes in tax policy, but also sought to
normalize the inequality and even the extreme deprivations
of lower class life. 293 In any event, it manifested itself in a
series of efforts to draw back available benefits, encourage
work, and limit eligibility-thereby to ensure that welfare
remained less eligible than life on the margins of the
working class. These efforts culminated in the 1996
enactment of the
Personal Responsibility and Work
294
Opportunity Act.
2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk4/artO5.htm. On the
"premium" that union representation creates in higher wages, see MISHEL ET
AL., supra note 259, at 181-89.
288. See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS:
RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (2005).
289. This theme is developed in the context of explaining black urban
poverty by William Julius Wilson. WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS
ch. 1 (1997); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1990).
290. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 262-63, 278 (10th ed. 1996).
291. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER PIERSON, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE? chs. 5-6
(3rd ed. 2006).
292. See generally JAMES O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (2001);
Claus Offe, Crises of Crisis Management: Elements of a Political Crisis Theory,
in CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 35 (John Keane ed. 1984).
293. See generally BRENDON O'CONNOR, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM: WHEN IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES (2004).
294. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. On the overall thrust of this
legislation, see O'CONNOR, supra note 294, at 226-35. On reform efforts prior to

810

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

All of these changes, together, might be said to embody
the ascendance of neo-liberal policy and ideology over those
of conventional post-war liberalism. 295 While post-war
liberalism never challenged the fundamental tenets of
capitalism and class structure, it did contemplate a viable
welfare state committed to modest redistribution of wealth,
income, and economic power via a functional social welfare
system and a modest array of labor and employment laws
and other means of economic regulation. Neo-liberalism
repudiates this approach entirely, aggressively dismantling
and discrediting government regulation of this sort while
bolstering government functions that are of direct benefit to
wealth and power businesses and denizens of the upper
class. Ironically, both neo-liberalism and the changes in
policy that have attended its rise might also be situated
within a broad decline in the overall viability of the
American economy. Reflected in long term declines in
important economic indicators, including productivity and
growth rates, 296 as well as the rising fortunes of competitive
economies, such a development is notably quite consistent
with other historical shifts in the geography of capitalism.
In any case, such a decline has given considerable authority
to the central neo-liberal projects of intensifying the
exploitation of the working class (as by the weakening of
the labor movement and the extension of working hours),
rolling-back the welfare state, and reducing tax burdens on
businesses and wealthy people.
The poverty of income and wealth brought about by
these changes has manifested itself in widespread material
deprivation. Faced with escalating property values and
declining government subsidies, a large and growing
segment of the lower classes finds itself unable to afford
this legislation, see Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and Bureaucrats: A
Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225, 280-98 (1998).
295. For a broad perspective on the rise of neoliberalism, its precepts, and
its implications for social policy, see generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY
OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005). See also ROBERT POLLIN, CONTOURS OF DESCENT: U.S.
ECONOMIC FRACTURES AND THE LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL AUSTERITY 3-20 (2003).

296. See Andrew Glyn, et al., The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age, in THE
GOLDEN AGE OF CAPITALISM: REINTERPRETING THE PosTwAR EXPERIENCE
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(Steven A. Marglin & Juliet B. Schor eds., 1990); David M. Gordon, Chickens
Home to Roost: From Prosperity to Stagnation in the Postwar U.S. Economy, in
UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE 34 (Michael A. Bernstein &
David E. Adler eds. 1994); see generally ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES:
A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991. at 403-18 (1996).
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adequate housing. 297 As a consequence, millions of lower
class people currently live in woefully substandard
dwellings which are often vermin-infested, crowded, and
298
without proper lighting, climate control, or plumbing.
Moreover, many poor people must skimp on other needs to
pay for housing, substandard or not. 299 Others are less
fortunate. Perhaps 750,000 people are homeless at any
given time; and each year, many times this number,
perhaps two or three million people "pass through" a state
of homelessness. 300 Importantly, these people are for the
most part homeless because they are poor, and not, as
popular conviction often holds, because they are mentally ill
or drug-addicted. 30 1 Moreover, the most durable component
of this population, those apt to remain homeless the
longest, are African-American males-who are also
disproportionately represented in the prison population.
Denied access to shelters and housing assistance, these men

297. See JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION'S HOUSING 2006, at 20-29 (2006) [hereinafter, THE STATE OF THE
NATION'S HOUSING].

298. Official data from the federal government reveals millions living in
substandard housing. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., TRENDS IN
WORST CASE NEEDS FOR HOUSING, 1978-1999 1-9 (2003). See also THE STATE OF
THE NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 298, at 26.

299. THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 298, at 26-27.
300. A January 2007 report by the advocacy group, the National Alliance to
End Homelessness, used a "point-in-time" count of the homeless conducted in
January 2005 to generate an estimate of 744,313 homeless people in America, of
whom 44% were "unsheltered." MARY CUNNINGHAM & MEGHAN HENRY,
HOMELESSNESS COUNTS 3, 10 (2007). This figure is not incompatible with data
from the federal government, which for the same month, January 2005,
estimates a total homeless population of 754,147, of whom 415,366 were
sheltered and 338,781 unsheltered. An analysis of census data from 1996
suggested that in a given year, 2.5 to 3.5 million people experience
homelessness. MARTHA BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA'S HOMELESS: EMERGENCY
SHELTERS OR AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2001).
301. While substance abuse and mental illness are surely problems that
contribute to and exacerbate homelessness, it is not at all clear that they
explain homelessness-not any more than substance abuse and mental illness
among the affluent explains the fact that these people are so seldom homeless.
On this issue, see for example, JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 26-27 (1992); KENNETH L. KUSMER, DOWN & OUT, ON THE
ROAD: THE HOMELESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 242-43 (2002); HEIDI SOMMER,
HOMELESSNESS IN URBAN AMERICA: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 13-14 (2000).
What is clear is that the homeless are "the poorest of the nation's poor,"
earning, according to Somner's 2000 review of urban homelessness, a median of
only $300 per month. Id. at 16-17.
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are, in the words of one scholar of homelessness, "generally
expected either to take care of themselves on the streets or
face incarceration. 3 °2
Deprivation shows itself in other realms as well. Nearly
15 million people with a household income of less than
$25,000 have no health insurance-despite the availability
30 3
of government insurance for some low income people.
Likewise, untold numbers of poor people curtail their
education or that of their dependents and forego clothing,
toiletries, and other basic necessities for want of
resources. 304 For others, poverty means food insecurity and
even hunger; according to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's annual report on the subject, in 2005, 11.0
percent of American households (about 35 million
individuals) experienced food insecurity during the year,
and of these households, 3.9 percent (about 10.5 million
individuals) experienced "very low
food security"-what the
30 5
Department used to call hunger.
Notably, for millions, too, these deprivations are not the
wages of idleness, but rather the bitter fruit of hard work in
monotonous, sometimes dangerous, and often degrading
employment conditions. 30 6 Indeed, according to some
authorities, almost half the people who are homeless work
for a living.30 7 Moreover, many of the poor who do not work
302. TODD DEPASTINO, CITIZEN HOBO:
SHAPED AMERICA 261 (2003).

How

A CENTURY OF HOMELESSNESS

303. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH COVERAGE IN THE

UNITED STATES: 2005, supranote 259, at 22 tbl.8
304. KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, No SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN
THE INNER CITY 39-41 (2000). See also HEATHER BOUSHEY & BETHNEY
GUNDERSEN, ECON. POL'Y INST., WHEN WORK JUST ISN'T ENOUGH: MEASURING
HARDSHIPS FACED BY FAMILIES AFTER MOVING FROM WELFARE TO WORK (2001).
305. MARK NORD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIGULTURE, HOUSEHOLD FOOD

SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006 at 6 tbl.1A (2007). On the Department's
change in terminology, see id. at 6. Not surprisingly, both measures of food
insecurity are concentrated among low-income households. Id. at 16.
306. The so-called "working poor" phenomenon is very real. See NEWMAN,
supra note 305, at 39-41; DAVID M. SCHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN

AMERICA (2005). According to the U.S. Department of Labor, as of 2004, 7.8
million people who worked or were actively looking for work lived in households
beneath the poverty line, with the phenomenon being most frequent among
workers in the service, construction, farming, and natural resource extraction

sectors. U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, A PROFILE OF THE

WORKING POOR, 2004, at 9 (2006).
307. SOMMER, supra note 302, at 17 (reporting that forty-nine percent of
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are in this condition not because they are fundamentally
lazy, but because they simply cannot find work. In other
cases, they are, by some combination of race, class, and
gender identity, criminal history, or physical disability,
effectively unemployable in the conventional sense. At the
same time, a very prominent but often-ignored feature of
lower class life is the degree to which conventional work,
"off-the-books" employment, and criminality interlace to
form networks of material support, security, and social
meaning for people who otherwise have little access to these
things. 30 8
2. Poverty, Inequality, and the Meaning of Prison
Violence. Here is where the logic of less eligibility comes
into play. On the one hand, life for the poor in America is
truly horrible: deprived, insecure, utterly undesirable. On
the other hand, as horrible as prison is even without the
risk of violence, it does shield its inhabitants from these
deprivations and insecurities. As mentioned above, prison
guarantees inmates a fairly decent and stable material
existence.
Inmates receive
more or less decent
accommodations, a reasonably balanced diet, and largely
competent medical and dental care. Moreover, they get all
of this at little or no cost to themselves. While they may be
compelled to work, seldom is such work particularly
arduous; and in any case willingness to work cannot be (and
almost never is) made a condition for continued receipt of
basic necessities. In fact, in some cases, prisoners may even
have the chance to advance their education or job skills
while incarcerated. To be sure, as other scholars have
pointed out, reactionary reformers continually seek to
maintain less eligibility precisely by limiting and even
worsening these aspects of incarceration. 30 9 But there are
homeless people describe work as a source of income). See also DOUG A. TIMMER
ET AL., PATHS TO HOMELESSNESS: EXTREME POVERTY AND THE URBAN HOUSING
CRISIS (1994).

308. For a telling account of this dynamic, see, for example, VENKATESH,
supranote 271.
309. On the role of less eligibility in explaining the restriction of prisoners'
access to reformatory work, see, for example, Gordon Hawkins, Prison Labor
and Prison Industries, 5 CRIME & JUST. 85, 101-03 (1983). On the role of less
eligibility in the curtailment of prisoners' access to educational opportunities,
see Joshua Page, Eliminating the Enemy: The Import of Denying Prisoners
Access to Higher Education in Clinton's America, 6 PUNISHMENT & SoC'Y 357
(2004).
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clear limits to how far such efforts can go, not least given
the institutional interests of prison administrators and
other corrections professionals in maintaining such
services. And there is, too, the law, which not only requires
that physical conditions of confinement meet minimal
constitutional standards, but also is more effective at
policing compliance with standards concerning such things
as diet, health care, and physical accommodations than it is
in dealing with something so diffuse and deniable as
violence.
The sad reality today is that, absent the element of
violence, life inside of prison is not so dramatically worse
for the poor than their lot in the free world, and in some
ways is better. This is not, of course, because prisons are
fundamentally
attractive places; but because the
circumstances of lower class life outside of prison are so
awful. Without the real threat of being assaulted and the
pervasive obligation to participate in a culture of violence
that come with incarceration, in some cases the poor might
well, by committing a crime, elect incarceration as a lastditch means of gaining material support. It is in fact very
easy to imagine how, if prisons were shorn of their culture
of violence, a truly desperate person-one with no job, no
shelter, perhaps intermittently hungry-might choose to be
incarcerated, if only to tide herself or himself over until a
time when conditions might hopefully improve. It is even
easier to see how, in the absence of such violence, a person
might adopt an attitude of deep indifference to
incarceration, perhaps neither desiring it nor particularly
dreading it. Such a person is more likely resort to crime as
a means of support or as an outlet of frustration and anger
about their social position, notwithstanding the risk of
imprisonment.
In fact, hundreds of thousands of poor people already
embrace crime or the meager offerings of incarceration in
this fashion, notwithstanding the cruel realities of prison
violence. The risk, from the standpoint of less eligibility, is
that without prison violence, many more would make this
choice. Violence helps to prevent this. It guarantees that
anyone so drawn to prison as a means of support or made
indifferent to its punitive aspirations by its relative
generosity in material support will have to reckon with the
risk of being assaulted; they will have to live a life defined
by the threat of violence; and they will have to inhabit this
world knowing (or soon made well aware) that there is
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seldom any escape from such violence.
To say that violence works in this way to enhance the
punitive effect of prison does not necessarily require that
people rationally calculate, on the basis of accurate
information, their criminal decisions-that they take into
account their precise chances of being victimized or the
exact costs involved in avoiding victimization. This kind of
scenario is unlikely and unrealistic in any case; and it is
also quite unnecessary to the logic of less eligibility. All that
is needed is the vaguest, most basic kind of deterrent-like
effect: that would-be prisoners know in a very general way
that violence is a pervasive and unavoidable aspect of the
prison experience; and that, if only in the most diffused
way, such a sense of prisons as violent enters their thoughts
about the value and consequences of engaging in criminal
behavior. In fact, research shows that incoming prisoners
perceive prison violence in precisely this way.3 10 In making
this point, it is worth stressing several others. The first is
something stressed earlier in discussing the dynamics of
violence in prison: that it is precisely a great uncertainty of
risk that gives violence in prison such a trenchant quality.
Second, it is also worth recalling that most people
imprisoned in this country are there for crimes that are
quite susceptible to at least this diffused kind of deterrence.
Finally, there is also the matter of general deterrence,
meaning, in this context, the way the horrors of prison
violence (including uncertainty about one's chances of being
victimized) are communicated to the poor generally gives
some of them pause to reconsider their compliance with
establishment norms and also reminds them of how
seriously the state takes this question.
To be sure, the claim here is not that prison violence
works perfectly to preserve and advance the logic of
punishment. There are ways in which violence might
actually work against less eligibility-as, for example, by
appealing to the appetite of the psychotically violent. In any
case, to expect such perfect functionality is an unrealistic
goal of social critique. Such a level of functionality is
irrelevant to a critique premised on identifying a major role
that violence plays in sustaining the meaning of the prison
as punishment. On a related point, to say that violence is

310. See Richard S. Jones & Thomas J. Schmid, Inmates' Conceptions of
Prison Sexual Assault, 69 PRISON J. 53, 54-55 (1989).
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central to the logic of punishment, and that punishment in
this sense is rooted in an agenda of class control, is not to
suggest that the overall project of control is carried out
perfectly or even (by its own standards) well. If it were, its
own apparent irrelevance would have been manifested long
ago in the very disappearance of class-related criminality.
The objection might also be raised that the less
eligibility function of prison violence is undercut by the
elevated role that violence plays in the lower class life in
the free world. In fact, the premise of this objection is true;
violence is concentrated in lower class communities.
Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, "street smart" inmates
who are familiar with violence are the ones most likely to
avoid being victimized and to perpetrate violence in prison.
Nevertheless, violence in prison is qualitatively different
than street violence. As noted earlier, violence in prison
occurs in an environment this is at least initially foreign to
the offender, featuring diverse racial, ethnic, and regional
groups, as well as the complicating omnipresence of state
authority in the person of the guards, and requiring
strategies and responses different than those appropriate to
the free world. Similarly, it is also much more difficult in
prison to control spatially and temporally the terms under
which one meets violence. One cannot as easily walk away
from conflict or remove oneself, even temporarily, from its
domain. Finally, even if those denizens of the lower class
who are most habituated to violence are to some extent less
influenced by prison violence in the equation of less
eligibility, this speaks only to their circumstances; it does
not address the situation of the remainder of that social
stratum, who likely still perceive the risks of victimization
that come with imprisonment, whether they have yet been
incarcerated or not.
To make another point clear: It is not my argument
that violence represents a discretely chosen aspect of
punishment policy. Indeed, it is quite clear that, but for
occasional outbursts of reactionary rhetoric, the idea of
violence as explicit part of punishment is roundly
renounced by elites who make these decisions. 311 We have
311. Occasionally, a figure of authority does expressly condone prison
violence. Pennsylvania prosecutor Gordon Zubrod recently elicited the criticism
of the Supreme Court of Canada for threatening defendants awaiting
extradition from Canada with prison rape. See United States v. Cobb, [2001] 1
S.C.R. 587 (Can.). Journalist Dan Bell recounts a similar statement in 2001 by
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seen this already in reviewing the role of the law in
proscribing, and in failing to prevent, prison violence. The
fact is that policies often emerge and hold sway without
ever being specifically nominated as such-and without
ever ceasing to be policies. Not least is this true of the
criminal justice system, whose many class-, race-, and
gender-control dimensions have been convincingly laid
bare, not only in the relative absence of documents that
confess these orientations, but against an entrenched
ideology (centered on the "justification" of punishment) that
aggressively denies such orientations. 312 Similarly, to say
that violence is part of the logic of punishment is to
participate in this kind of immanent critique that cuts
against the force of official pronouncements and ideology.
Rusche deemed less eligibility as the "leitmotiv" of
punishment, not its formal purpose.3 13 To again invoke
Gresham Sykes, violence is an "unplanned concomitant" of
incarcerations, but it is part of the metric of punishment all
the same. 314 As Sykes appreciated, it is illegal, to be sure;
but such illegality does not negate its character as a mode
of punishment or, indeed, as an integral feature of
punishment policy. Violence is an obvious and enduring
part of the prison that has remained conspicuously immune
to efforts at abolition by law. Its illegality of course
precludes it being formally authorized as punishment at the
same time that, as argued earlier, it helps to obscure this
function.
In fact, violence performs its less eligibility function
with some unique advantages to the criminal justice
system. By relying on violence to sustain its punitive
function, the prison is able to retain its character as
punishment without descending to overtly debased
practices-for example, starving inmates, denying them
basic health care, or making them perform truly arduous
labor and thus putting itself in flagrant violation of basic
constitutional and human rights norms. And yet because
prison violence is so familiar (if in a distorted, caricatured
California Attorney General William Lockyer, that he would 'love to personally
escort [Kenneth] Lay... to an 8-by-10 cell that he could share with a tattooed
dude that says, 'Hi, my name is Spike, honey."' Bell, supranote 66, at 18.
312. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY,
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
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way) the prison is able, too, to retain the legitimacy that
flows via a widespread faith that, by violence, the prison
continues to punish those who flout dominant, officially
sanctioned social norms. Ironically, by these means,
violence allows those invested in a sanitized, bourgeois
vision of criminal justice as a neat means of correction and
retribution to believe this vision can be realized, even when
they acknowledge how pervasive violence actually is in
prison-provided, of course, they do not see it as an integral
part of punishment. Violence has yet another advantage in
this context. It is, for the most part, free. True,
governments may occasionally incur financial liability. But
this is rare, and the amounts involved quite meager. For
the most part, beatings, rapes, and such come at no extra
expense to the taxpayer.
The connection that less eligibility reveals between
prison violence and political economy gives historical
content to the evolution of violence in this realm. In
particular, the critique of prison violence in terms of less
eligibility suggests that the overall intensity of violence in
prison is dependent, not so much on questions of social
morality, law, or even politics in the narrow sense of the
word, but rather political economy and ultimately social
inequality: the greater the level of social inequality, the
greater the risk to less eligibility, the more pressure to
sustain the punitive function of the prison. In this light the
increase and entrenchment of prison violence described
earlier in this Article can be seen in the light of the logic
just described, as a response precisely to the stagnation and
deterioration of the condition of the lower classes over that
same period. As the logic of less eligibility has called for
more pronounced means of punition, violence has become
ever more entrenched in the prison experience and ever
more integral to the prison's function as prison. Or, to put
this differently, if one wants to identify the root cause of
prison violence, one should look not so much for ineffective
laws, sadistic or incompetent prison staff or administrators,
or political motifs of the abstract and detached sort.
Instead, one must look more broadly and more deeply into
the structure and ideology of contemporary society: at the
relentless use of the criminal law to punish and control the
poor; at the ruthless conditions of deprivation and
inequality that define poverty in our society; and ultimately
at the very logic of capitalism, which so inexorably
generates all these conditions. Here one will find the true
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reasons that our prisons are so awash in violence.
CONCLUSION

To argue, as this Article does, that violence is integral
to the functionality of the prison in contemporary society,
brings to the surface a number of important issues. Not
least among these is the question, what can be done about
this? The dominant impulse among humane, reformminded people is to think that, surely, the problem of
violence in prison can and should be addressed by changes
in law and policy. But as Rusche observed, less eligibility is,
if nothing else, a ceiling on reform. If, as I argue here,
violence is truly essential to the prison's ability to punish
the poor, and so to advance penal and social control
agendas that are fundamental to modern criminal justice,
then the quest for reform is likely doomed to failure, in that
it unknowingly encompasses a challenge to the very notion
of the prison. Rusche does speak of another possibility: that
if reform would destroy the lesser eligibility of punishment
it might nonetheless be carried out provided it is
accompanied by a "more subtle deterioration of prison
conditions. 315 This is not merely an unfortunate prospect.
Arguably, it explains the prison's reliance on illegal
violence, in that violence has become so integral to the
punitive integrity of prison in the first place precisely
because prison conditions have improved in so many other
respects.
There is yet another possibility implied in the radical
tone of Rusche's critique. If, as I argue, the root cause of
persistent prison violence can be located in the prison's
enduring commitment to punishing the poor and doing so
amidst conditions of staggering social inequality and
material deprivation, then the problem of prison violence
can actually be refocused as an issue of class conflict and
class inequality-and redressed on that level. To make this
point differently, just as less eligibility can be taken,
generally, as a means of justifying the deprivation or
brutalization of inmates, so too can the concept be read in a
more radical vein to counsel an attack on the social
circumstances that render the idea of prison devoid of
violence so self-contradictory in the first place.

315. Labor Market and Penal Sanction, supra note 235, at 4.
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Of course there is no reason to think this likely-and
every reason to think that violence will continue to play an
important role in punishment. Perhaps no single fact
underscores this unfortunate point more clearly, or makes
clearer the real way that class, political economy, and
punishment interact in our society, than a recent
development in sentencing policy. Rather than improve jail
conditions for all inmates, a number of jurisdictions (chiefly
in California) now offer to the affluent, for about $100 a
day, exclusive confinement, in a facility devoid of the
unpleasant-and violent-conditions to be found in the
normal lock-up. 316 What better way to maintain the less
eligibility of punishment for the poor while sparing those
few convicted people who are not poor the needless pain
that these conditions would entail? Such is the likely
destiny of punishment reform in class society.

316. Jennifer Steinhauer, For $82 a Day, Booking a Cell in a 5-Star Jail,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, at All.

